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Crowdsourcing A Trademark: 
What the Public Giveth, the Courts May 
Taketh Away 
by 
LLEWELLYN JOSEPH GIBBONS* 
Abstract 
There is a long tradition of trademark holders relying on the 
public to create designations that they then adopt as a trademark. 
Historically, this has been a long and slow process.  Acquiring 
secondary meaning from the individual’s first use of the designation 
could take years.  Web 2.0 and other forms of social media have the 
potential to speed up this process through the use of User Generated 
Content (UGC).  Frequently, coined designations are nicknames for 
well-known brands, so they are potentially quite valuable. 
Trademark law is ambiguous regarding who owns a designation 
created by the public, if the individual claiming the mark has not 
appropriated the mark by actually using it in commerce.  Ownership 
of the mark is one of the elements of a claim of trademark 
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infringement.  The public use doctrine attempts to solve this problem 
by imputing the public’s non-commercial use of the designation as a 
commercial use for the benefit of the referent-mark holder, and so 
permits the referent-mark holder to appropriate rights in the mark 
without actually using it in commerce.  The public use doctrine is a 
weak basis on which to claim a crowd-sourced mark; therefore, this 
article looks at alternative remedies that are available to the referent-
mark holder, and concludes that unfair competition or infringement 
by trademark dilution are better remedies. 
I. Introduction
The crowd sourcing of trademarks is not new.  In 1916, Planters 
Peanuts held a contest to develop its logo.1  For over a century, 
contests and competitions to name new products or to write new 
advertising jingles have been common methods of tapping into the 
“wisdom of crowds.” 2
Traditionally, the process took years or even generations; the 
public created a new designation, that designation acquired secondary 
meaning, and then achieved commercial significance.  Perhaps the 
designation of Coke is the best example of this process and has 
ultimately become one of the most valuable global marks: COKE.
  However, these models of discovering 
potential trademarks have one salient fact.  The crowd (much like an 
advertising agency) coins the designation; the merchant then 
appropriates the designation by using it in commerce and thus the 
merchant transforms the otherwise eligible designation into a 
protectable trademark.  The laws governing these cases are 
traditional principles of trademark law.  The ownership of the mark 
belongs to the merchant; because the origin of the mark is irrelevant, 
the merchant, through bona fide use in commerce, appropriates the 
mark from the public domain. 
3
1. PLANTERS PEANUTS http://www.planters.com/history.aspx?section=timeline (last
visited Oct.  17, 2012). 
2. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (Anchor Books
2005); See also Sitaram Asur and Bernardo A.  Huberman, Predicting the Future with 
Social Media, WI-IAT ‘10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON WEB INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENT AGENT TECHNOLOGY, 
Volume 01, at 492 (2010) available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1914092 (“social 
media can be construed as a form of collective wisdom”). 
3. The Coca-Cola brand is estimated to be worth $71.8 billion dollars.  See
http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/previous-years/Best-Global-Brands-
2011-report.aspx (last visited Oct.  17, 2012).   Coca-Cola (Coke) and Diet Coke are their 
two best selling products.  See Leon Stafford, Coca-Cola Holds Top Spot, but Category 
Keeps Loosing Market Share, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (Mar.  20, 2012), 
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Around 1915, the public coined the designation Coke as a nickname 
for Coca-Cola.4  Initially, Coca-Cola actively discouraged its use of 
the designation Coke to refer to its products.  Coca-Cola did not 
publically embrace the designation Coke until June 1941.5  One may 
assume that it took 26 years before the designation Coke achieved 
sufficient commercial success and the Coca-Cola Company felt the 
need to formally appropriate the Coke designation as the COKE 
trademark.  Often, pre-Web 2.0, the referent-mark holder could 
patiently wait to determine whether the designation appeared to be 
gaining commercial recognition among consumers and only then did 
the referent-mark holder have to decide whether to appropriate the 
designation.6
This may no longer be true.  Although, not a crowd sourced 
mark, the APP STORE mark example is offered as evidence 
of how quickly the strength of a mark can change in the Web 
2.0 era.  A merely descriptive designation such as APP 
STORE can go from a weak mark to a strong famous mark in 
barely twenty-seven months, from first use in commerce to the 
filing of litigation.
 
7  In Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Apple 
sued Amazon.com, Inc. for trademark infringement over the 
APP STORE mark.8
http://www.ajc.com/news/business/coca-cola-holds-top-spot-but-category-keeps-
losing/nQSLy/.   This article will endeavor to use italics to indicate a publicly coined 
designation, all CAPS to indicate a trademark, and upper and lower case letters when 
discussing the mark.   So, Coke is a publically coined designation that was adopted by 
Coke as the COKE trademark. 
  The origin of the designation App Store 
4. See Phil Mooney, Comment to Coke Means Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA 
CONVERSATIONS, (June 16, 2008, 5:43 PM), https://www.coca-
colaconversations.com/2008/06/coke-means-coca.html.  
5. See Phil Mooney, Coke Means Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA CONVERSATIONS, (June
16, 2008), https://www.coca-colaconversations.com/2008/06/coke-means-coca.html.  But 
Coca-Cola did litigate the use of the Coke designation by others as early as 1916.  See 
Coca-Cola Co.  v.  Koke Co.  of America, 235 F.  408 (D.  Ariz.  1916), rev’d on other 
grounds, 255 F.  894 (9th Cir.  1919), rev’d on other grounds, 254 U.S.  143 (1920). 
6. The term referent-mark refers to the senior mark or brand to which the publicly
coined designation refers. 
7. Apple, Inc.  v.  Amazon.com Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.  2d 1835, 1840-41 (N.D.  Cal.
2011) (assuming without deciding that APP STORE is a descriptive mark which “arguably 
acquired secondary meaning.”); id.  at  1844 (rejecting Apple’s claim that APP STORE is 
a famous mark); see also section, IV.A, infra discussing the APP STORE mark’s claim to 
fame. 
8. Apple, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.  2d at 1836 (Apple asserted five causes of action—(1)
trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and false description under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, (2) dilution under section 43(c) Lanham Act; (3) trademark 
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is hotly contested.9  Interestingly, Apple claims to have coined 
the designation App Store,10 and Amazon vigorously denied 
Apple’s claim to have coined the mark.11  Although APP 
STORE was technically not a crowd-sourced mark, this mark 
was not developed internally by Apple or by its agents.12 
Rather, another company fielded the “app store” idea to 
Apple, which critiqued the idea because it needed a large-
scale platform in order to be functional. 13  The smaller, 
company prior to any actual use in commerce, then 
abandoned its Lanham Act § 1(b) intent to use trademark 
application for the APP STORE mark and the related 
Internet domain name www.appstore.com on December 5, 
2008,14 and selected a new mark.15
Meanwhile, starting in July 2008, Apple started to license apps 
and to distribute them through its App Store portal on iTunes;
  On July 17, 2008, Apple 
filed an application for trademark registration based on use in 
commerce. 
16
infringement under common law; (4) dilution under common law; and (5) unfair 
competition under California Business & Professions Code § 17200.) 
 in 
September 2010, Amazon started to solicit software developers to 
develop Android apps; and by March 2011, when Amazon.com 
started to use the “app store” to license Android based applications, 
9. Id.
10. See Second Amended Complaint at 2, Apple, Inc.  v.  Amazon.com, Inc., 100





11. Amazon.com, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.  2d at 1843.
12. See Larry Dignan, Apple’s App Store and a Little Trademark History,
TECHREPUBLIC, (March 22, 2011), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/mac/apples-app-
store-and-a-little-trademark-history/1063, March 22, 2011. 
13. Id.
14. Trademark Status and Document Retrival for No.  78907865, UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
(http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=78907865&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=sta
tusSearch)(filed an intent to use application in 2006 which they abandoned in 2008).  
However, the first attempt to register the mark APPSTORE was by Sage Networks, which 
abandoned their attempt to trademark APPSTORE in 2000.  Dignan, supra 12. 
15. Dignan, supra note 12.
16. Trademark Status and Document Retrival for No.  77525433, UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=77525433&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch 
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Apple contended that the APP STORE mark had already become a 
famous mark.  However, by December 2008, the New York Times ran 
a story “It began with Apple’s iPhone App Store, then spread to the 
Google Android Market; the Palm App Store opened this week and 
the BlackBerry Store opens in March.”17  The story later added insult 
to injury by using the term app store in a generic sense to mean a 
place where one purchases computer applications (apps).18
This article theorizes that this process, from the public coining of 
the designation to the designation achieving commercial significance, 
will develop increasingly faster as the use of social media becomes 
seamlessly woven into the public’s (and more importantly, a 
consumer’s) social interaction with the brand, and the increasing 
ability of consumers to communicate with others interested in the 
brand.  Recently, scholarship indicates that only a handful of mavens 
or taste leaders can tip social desirability of a product.
  The New 
York Times article reflected a consumer understanding of the 
designation app store. 
19
This article explores the legal issues involved when the crowd, 
though common or popular use, bestows a new designation on the 
referent-trademark holder’s goods or services.  The crowd’s gifting of 
a designation creates potential problems for the recipient merchant. 
The merchant must decide to reject (abandon) or accept the 
designation.  This decision will affect whether the merchant is or can 
become a trademark holder of the public designation.  If the 
merchant rejects the designation through non-use or running counter 
The 
technological change represented in Web 2.0 and social media may 
reconceptualize the role of the public from that of a passive recipient 
of a mark created by the brand holder to the public as an active force 
in creating new commercially significant designations. 
17. David Pogue, Envelop, Please.  It’s a Pogie, NY TIMES, Dec.  18, 2008 at B1.  See
Lanham Act § 43(c)(1)(G)(“the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by 
third parties” as a factor of trademark dilution fame). 
18. Id.  (“[a]n app store turns the smartphone into something .  .  .  the cellphone app 
store takes the trophy as the Tech Idea of the Year.”). 
19. See generally, Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2002).   It is not a new phenomenon.  Clark Gable’s bare 
chest in the motion picture It Happened One Night allegedly sent undershirt sales 
plummeting.  See Amy T.  Peterson and Ann T.  Kellogg, THE GREENWOOD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLOTHING THROUGH AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900 TO THE PRESENT: 
VOLUME 1, 1900-1949, at 277-78 (Greenwood 2008)(the practice of leaving the last button 
of a men’s vest undone following the example of King Edward VII).  See also Alan J.  
Flusser, STYLE AND THE MAN, at 14 (HarperCollins 1996). 
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advertising, the designation should remain in the public domain as far 
as trademark ownership is concerned.  However, if the merchant 
eventually accepts the designation, the plaintiff must show that the 
plaintiff owns a valid trademark as an element of a claim of 
trademark infringement.  The law is unclear about whether the 
trademark can be appropriated from the public domain absent actual 
bona fide use in commerce or whether the public use is imputed to 
the referent-mark holder, as well as what the priority date for a crowd 
sourced mark is: some date within the period that it was first used by 
the public or the actual bona fide first use by the referent-mark 
holder?  Finally, the law is equally unclear on what remedies, if any, 
are there for the unauthorized use of the public’s designation, 
provided it has not been properly appropriated from the public 
domain. 
This article concludes that if the merchant did not appropriate the 
designation, a competitor’s use of the designation may be actionable 
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a form of unfair 
competition, but is not actionable under that section as trademark 
infringement.  However, if the public’s designation has acquired 
commercial secondary meaning, then it may be a basis on which to 
oppose or cancel a federal trademark registration.  Therefore, this 
article recommends that sophisticated mark holders should be alert 
for new public designations of their products and consider 
appropriating these designations at the earliest opportunity, either 
through the early development common law trademark rights or 
through federal registration, especially if the designation appears 
poised to become commercially significant.  However, this may be 
easier said than done in an age of instant fame and social media 
interconnectivity. 
II. Social Media
New forms of social media will increase the rate at which 
consumers accept a new publically coined designation to represent 
existing marks.  In addition, social media will also increase the 
rapidity with which public designations achieve commercial 
significance.20  Web 2.0 is a technological platform on which User 
Generated Content (UGC) is built;21
20. See Andreas M.  Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The
Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS.  HORIZONS 59, 61 (2010). 
 social media is one form of user-
21. See generally Social Media, WIKPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media.
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generated content. 22   UGC must be published on a publically 
available site; demonstrate some creativity; and be created outside of 
the users’ professional endeavors. 23  A mere exchange of email, 
unchanged reposting/redistribution of preexisting content, or 
commercial advertising does not count.  UGC existed long before 
Web 2.0; however, broadband, new software, and the increase in the 
public’s use and acceptance of technology have resulted in a new 
digital environment.24 Social media has been defined as “a group of 
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and 
exchange of User Generated Content.”25
This article postulates that one proxy to demonstrate the 
influence of Web 2.0 and social media in creating new designations is 
to consider the increase in the rate of new words being recognized in 
dictionaries.  Editors of dictionaries recognize new words based on 
their persistent use by the public.
  The actual technologies, 
norms, and practices of social media are not static and continue to 
evolve in the context of changes in technology, social norms, and 
laws. 
26  One expert has opined, “With the 
explosion of digital media and convergence devices, people are 
creating and using new words more widely and at a greater pace than 
usual.” 27   Further, between 1993 and again in 1997, the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) added approximately 3,000 words or 
about 1,000 words per year.28  Recently, the OED has been adding 
words at the rate of approximately 4,000 words per year.29
22. Id.
  One may 
speculate that since the increase in the rate of newly recognized 
words correlates well with the development of Web 2.0, an increase in 
User Generated Content (UGC), and the growth of social media, 
23. Id.
24. Id.  at 61.
25. Id.
26. See generally Ellen P.  Aprill, The Law of the Word; Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ.  ST.  L.J.  275, 292-94 (1998) (describing how editors create 
dictionary entries). 
27. Hannah Boen, New Words Added to Dictionary not a Surprise to Area Language
Lovers, REPORTER NEWS (Aug.  15, 2012), 
http://www.reporternews.com/news/2012/aug/15/new-words-added-to-dictionary-not-a-
surprise-to/?print=1. 
28. See Oxford English Dictionary, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Sept.  18, 2012, 12:59), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_English_Dictionary. 
29. Id.
   
42 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 35:1 
there is some positive relationship between the creation of new words 
and changes in consumer communication. 
If the public can develop a brand and destroy a brand, then the 
public can surely create designations for products that will quickly 
become widespread and achieve commercial significance.30  Word-of-
mouth has always been a critical part of any brand building strategy, 
and word of mouth has gone viral in the Web 2.0 milieu.  One 
commentator observed, “online word of mouth poses the most 
important challenge to the Internet trademark law.” 31   “The 
technology that was supposed to empower marketers has empowered 
consumers instead.”32  Prior to the Internet, individual taste-shapers 
were able to share their opinions with a few friends. 33  At the 
beginning of Web 2.0, a few years ago, these same individuals could 
blog or post something on their websites that may be read by a few 
close members of their family and their circle of friends.34  Until very 
recently, the dominant force creating brands and brand images was 
the brand owner, who used pricing, the consumer’s product 
experience, commercial advertising, and retail-space interactions with 
consumers to develop the brand image.35  However, even pre-Web 
2.0, brand owners recognized that consumer word of mouth or 
consumer buzz could mean success or failure of a brand.36
Historically, these influential mavens of taste had to work through 
connectors and salespeople to get the message out.  Social media 
creates a process of disintermediation that permits the mavens or 
taste-leaders to directly reach the end user without necessarily using 
connectors, weakening or eliminating the importance of salespeople. 
Social media now absorbs and extends the reach of the connector and 
 
30. W.  Glynn Mangold & David J.  Faulds, Social Media: The New Hybrid Element
of the Promotion Mix, 52 BUS.  HORIZONS 357, 359 (2009). 
31. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and its Implications for Trademark Law, in 
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404, 
(Graeme B.  Dinwoodie and Mark D.  Janis, eds., Edward Elgar Press 2007), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020695. 
32. Susan Fournier & Jill Avery, The Uninvited Brand, 54 BUS.  HORIZONS 193, 193 
(2011). 
33. See Gladwell, supra note 19 at 179 (social networks rarely exceeded 150 people).
34. See Mangold & Faulds, supra note 30 at 359 (“Conventional marketing wisdom
has long held that a dissatisfied customer tells ten people.   That is out of date.  In the age 
of social media, he or she has the tools to tell 10 million”). 
35. See Fournier & Avery, supra note 32 at 194.
36. See Goldman, supra note 30, at 409; David Court, Dave Elzinga, Susan Mulder,
and Ole Jorgen Vetvik, The Consumer Decision Journey, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (June 
2009), http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_consumer_decision_journey_2373, (67% of 
consumer purchase decisions are primarily influencedby word of mouth). 
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salesperson function into Web 2.0 technology, thus rapidly facilitating 
new crowd-sourced public designations for existing products.  The 
scope of social media use is also increasing the potential range of a 
connector-community. 
Today, social media has provided the average person with a huge 
megaphone to amplify their influence to shape consumer-tastes in the 
future and unprecedented opportunities to saturate trademarks with 
new meaning.37  Empowered by Internet technology, consumers can 
infuse a brand with buzz, investing it with magnetism and economic 
value, or they can force a trademark into oblivion even against the 
wealthiest content owners.  One commentator observed that “the 
separate nature of many brand relationships—the ‘them’ and ‘us’—is 
obsolete.”38
Web 2.0 technology, especially social media, reduces consumer 
costs to disseminate their views widely.
 
39  Web 2.0 technologies permit 
the consumer to expand the scope of his or her social network beyond 
his or her physical social network, and permits members of the virtual 
social network to “like,” “re-tweet,” or forward a message to 
members of their social networks.40  Unlike oral speech, which is 
ephemeral, and written speech in the physical world, which is difficult 
to locate, web content is easily located, and may be accessible 
forever:41
[N]ew online intermediaries [such as Amazon.com, eBay,
TripAdvisor] have emerged to systematically capture and 
republish consumer opinion. Search engines have further 
concentrated the value of the public designation or word of 
mouth. Brand owners compete with blogs, opinion sites, and 




Even if the brand is prominently featured in a search engine 
result, it may be surrounded by critical consumer commentary.  One 
   
37. See generally State of the Media: The Social Media Report, NIELSEN, Q3 (2011)
(“60 percent of social media users create reviews of products and services” and 
“consumer-created reviews/ratings are the preferred source for information about 
product/service value, price and product quality”). 
38. See Deborah R.  Gerhardt, Social Networks and the Law:  Social Media Amplify
Consumer Investmetn in Trademarks, 90 N.C.L.  REV.  1491, 1499 (2012). 
39. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 411.
40. See Fournier & Avery, supra, at 194 & 200.
41. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 411.
42. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 412.
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commentator concluded that “a single consumer, through favorable 
search engine placement, might influence thousands or even millions 
of potential customers, and because online word of mouth can survive 
indefinitely, the Internet ‘remembers’ a trademark owner’s historical 
choices and practices.”43
Consumer communication through Web 2.0 and social media may 
be described as networks composed of nodes and connected by ties.
 
44 
Of course, not all ties are created equal.45  There are leaders and 
followers among the nodes so that the sharing of information is 
asymmetrically reciprocal.46  These leaders may be described as brand 
mavens or brand advocates and have a disproportionate influence on 
consumers’ choices and brand development.47  This process is roughly 
analogous to the social process that creates sudden change described 
by Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point: How Little Things can 
Make a Big Difference.48  In the model postulated in this Article, the 
nodes are individuals or institutional groups and ties represent the 
sharing of information among groups.49  Pre-Web 2.0 (and newer 
forms of social media such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and 
Google+), individual-nodes found it difficult to create ties with other 
individual-nodes, which shared common interests.  Without the 
assistance of social media to locate interested nodes, developing ties 
among nodes was serendipitous at best.50  Brands are the social glue 
that connects many communities of individuals.51
43. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 413.
 
44. See Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1495.
45. See Eric Gilbert & Karrie Karahalios, Predicting Tie Strength with Social Media,
CHI PROCEEDINGS OF THE 27TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS 
IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 211-220 (2009) available at 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1518736. 
46. See Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1495;  Ronald A.  Clark and Ronald E.
Goldsmith, Market Mavens: Psychological Influences, 22 PSYCHOLOGY & MARKETING 
289, 289-90 (April 2005). 
47. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 409.
48. See Gladwell, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing mavens).
49. See Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1495.
50. Other forms of social media also facilitates the creation of ties, for example
review sites such as TripAdvisor or merchants that permit consumers or the public to post 
feedback on their experiences with a good or service, and of course, sites which permit 
readers to post comments all facilitate the creation of ties.  See Gerhardt, supra note 38 at 
1495. 
51. Id.  at 1508.
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The consuming public is often erroneously viewed as merely 
passive consumers of trademarks and brand images. 52  Recently, 
scholarship suggests that the public is an active player in creating and 
maintaining brands and their images.53  Trademark holders, even the 
holders of famous marks, tend to be followers rather than leaders 
when it comes to using new forms of communication.  In the 1990s, 
the owners of famous trademarks came to the Internet only to find 
that their marks had already been appropriated by cybersquatters as 
domain names. 54   More recently, trademark holders arrived at 
Facebook and Twitter with the expectations to develop their marks, 
only to find that consumers had beat them to these newer forms of 
social media.55
This results in a world where the story of a brand is one that is 
jointly authored by the brand owner and the brand’s adherents or its 
critics.  No longer are successful consumer brands developed solely or 
even primarily through a top down approach which is totally 
dominated, if not totally controlled, by the brand owner.  Rather, 
successful brand development is a collaborative effort between the 
brand owner and the public.  “Various constituencies of consumers 
generate product names, package designs, and advertising for leading 
contenders.”
  In a race between the plodding mark holder and the 
cutting edge consumer-market-maven, the consumer will almost 
always be the first adopter of any new technology—slowly followed 
by a brand and its image consultants. 
56
52. See Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13
VAND.  J.  ENT.  & TECH.  L.  1, 6 (2010); Deborah R.  Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in 
Trademark, 88 N.C.L.  REV.  427, 450-53 (2010); Deven R.  Desai, Is Pepsi Really a 
Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO.  L.J.  2119, 2127  
(2012); Mark P.  McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory Of Trademark Law.   
98 VA.  L.  REV.  67 (2012). 
Further, “marketers engage in rigorous searches for 
organically-created brand messages that can be co-opted for the 
53. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra, note 38 at 1493; Rebecca Tushnet, Gone In Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law And Cognitive Science, 86 TEX.  L.  REV.  507 (2012); Mark 
P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory Of Trademark Law,  98 VA.  L.  REV.
67 (2012);
54. See Fournier and Avery, supra note 34 at 195; Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN:
Between The Public And The Private—Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECH.  
L.J.  1071, 1079 (1999).
55. See Michael L.  Rustad & Diane D’Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An
Annotated Guide to Legal Landmarks, 2011 DUKE L.  & TECH.  REV.  12, 1, 58 (2011); See 
generally Thomas J.  Curtin, The Name Game: Cybersquatting and Trademark 
Infringement on Social Media Websites, 19 J.L.  & POL’Y 353 (2010). 
56. See Fournier and Avery, supra note 32 at 196.
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benefit of the firm.”57  Other firms monitor social media twenty-four 
hours a day, measuring the public’s reaction to the brand. 58
III. Trademark Infringement
 
Consequently, brand holders increasingly recognize the power of the 
consuming public using Web 2.0 and social media. 
The focus of this article is not on the public’s use of an 
abbreviation or confusing colorable imitation of a trademark that is 
already clearly prohibited under trademark law, for example  “Opry” 
for the mark “Grand Ole Opry,”59 “Coke” for “Coca-Cola,”60 “Jack” 
for “Jack Daniel’s,” or initials, such as “PP” for “Planned 
Parenthood” 61 or “IBM” for “International Business Machines.” 62 
Rather, it focuses on altogether new designations such as “Hog” for 
“Harley-Davidson,”63 “Mickey D” for “McDonalds,”64 “Big Blue” for 
“IBM,”65 or “Tarzhay” or “Tarjay” for Target.66
57. Id.
  These designations 
58. Id.  at 197.
59. See, e.g., WSM, Inc.  v.  Bailey, 297 F.  Supp.  870, 872-873 (M.D.  Tenn.  1969).
60. See, e.g., Coca-Cola v.  Busch, 44 F.  Supp.  405, 409-10 (Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  1942).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed.  of Am., Inc.  v.  Problem Pregnancy of
Worcester, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Mass.  1986). 
62. Cf.  15 U.S.C.  §1114(1)(a) (2006)(prohibiting the commercial use of a
“reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation.”). 
63. The mark HOG has been registered by Harley-Davidson for motorcycle repair
services.  See HOG, Registration No.  78432092, available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=78432092&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch, but it has been abandoned for exhibitions, motorcycle club services, and 
motorcycle competitions.  See HOG, Registration No.  78431581, available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=78431581&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch, but it has been abandoned because of a failure to respond or late response. 
64. McDonald’s has registered the mark MICKEY D’S for clothing and restaurant
services.  See MICKEY D’s, Registration No.  1666796, available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=74078677&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch, and MICKEY D’s.  Registration No.  1292557, available at 
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4010:6obcbf.3.5. 
65. The IBM Corp.  has abandoned the US registration for the mark BIG BLUE.
See BIG BLUE, Registration No.  73741661, available at
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=74078677&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch.   IBM used the moniker Big Blue for decades (starting in the 1960s) prior to its
trademark registration in 1989.  See Eric Schmitt, From ‘Big Blue’ to Big Blue: Find
Another Name, or Else, NY TIMES, May 11, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/11/business/from-big-blue-to-big-blue-find-another-
name-or-else.html.
66. The author has been unable to find any U.S.  trademark registration for the
designations Tarjay or Tarzhay.  Target’s chief marketing officer describes these terms as 
a “gift” from customers.  See Target’s Nickname Tar-zhay (CNBC Video Jan.   3, 2011), 
available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1719878893.  However, he also stated 
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are not merely colorable extensions of an already protected mark.67
Sometimes, however, a merchant will reject the public’s gift of a 
designation either by affirmatively discouraging the use of the 
public’s designation (for example, Coca-Cola and IBM initially 
discouraged the public’s use of COKE and BIG BLUE respectively), 
or by ignoring the new designation (for example Tarzhay for 
Target).
 
Rather, these designations should be analyzed as marks in their own 
right independent of the senior referent-mark or brand. If a crowd-
sourced designation is adopted or appropriated by the referent-mark 
holder and used by the referent-mark holder in commerce as a mark, 
then the use by a competitor merely presents a run-of-the-mill 
trademark infringement case.  However, if the referent-mark holder 
has not appropriated the designation, then there are significant 
questions regarding the referent-mark holder’s trademark rights to 
prevent the designation from being used by others.  In order to have a 
remedy, there must be a legal right. 
68
The question is whether this constitutes likelihood of consumer 
confusion trademark infringement.  Appropriating the designation by 
the putative trademark holder is the sine qua non of trademark 
ownership.  If trademark ownership does not exist solely through the 
public’s use of the designation, then there is a battle for priority and 
senior trademark user rights.  This is a conflict between a competitor, 
who has adopted the public designation by its actual bona fide use in 
Over time, these public designations may become as 
popular (and as valuable), if not more popular than the merchant’s 
chosen mark.  Seizing an opportunity, a competitor may then take 
steps to appropriate the public’s coined designation for its own goods 
or services.  A competitor’s use of the designation may result in the 
loss of some of the goodwill associated with the designation, the 
competitor free riding on the reputation of the merchant, and create a 
likelihood of consumer confusion or deception. 
that Target would never use these terms.  See id.  I would argue that merely the affectation 
of a faux French pronunciation of an English language word mark is not sufficient to 
prevent the likelihood of consumer confusion.  Cf.  Coca-Cola Co.  v.  Christopher, 37 F.  
Supp.  216, 216 (E.D.  Mich.  1941) (LA COQ versus COKE). 
67. It should go without saying that the author is not opining on the legal rights or
status of any of the marks used as examples in this article.  Any use of a mark in the article 
is solely illustrative of a point in the discussion, and the mark was selected solely because 
the reader is likely to be familiar with the mark. 
68. While this Article treats the creation of a public designation as a “gift” to the
referent-mark holder, other models such as the consumer investment model would grant 
the public limited recognized rights to use the mark base on their economic and emotional 
investment in a brand and its development.  See generally Gerhardt, supra note 38. 
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commerce, and the referent-mark holder, who was gifted the 
designation (and arguably any secondary meaning) without any use in 
commerce.  Neither party has any substantial claim to a right in the 
mark or the protection of equity.  Finally, as a matter of public policy, 
should principles of “first in time, first in right” property rights in 
trademark trump strongly held policies preventing the likelihood of 
consumer confusion in resolving these questions? 
Under trademark law, the affirmative right granted to a mark 
holder is the right to prevent uses in commerce that are likely to 
result in consumer confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship.69  In 
addition to the statutory requirements of the Lanham Act, courts 
have imposed another essential element of a claim of trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act: the ownership of the alleged 
infringed mark.70  In the United States, there are two main bodies of 
law that result in mark ownership and under which marks are 
protected: state common law and the Lanham Trademark Act.71 
Under either body of trademark law, the mark holder must 
appropriate from the public domain a designation capable of 
distinguishing its goods or services from that of others through a bona 
fide use in commerce.72
This article will not discuss state common law trademark 
infringement versus federal trademark infringement of unregistered 
marks in detail, because the test for trademark infringement is 
substantially the same under either body of law.
 
73  Both bodies of law 
make ownership an essential element in a trademark infringement 
claim.  There are other requirements to obtain trademark rights.  For 
example, the mark must have either inherent or acquired secondary 
meaning to be capable of functioning as a mark and to distinguish 
(identify) goods or services as an indicator of source or origin.74
69. Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C.  § 1441 (2006) & §43(a), 15 U.S.C.  § 1125(a)
(2006).  See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.  v.  Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.  111, 
117-18 (2004).
  This 
70. Fed.  Treasury Enter.  Sojuzplodoimport v.  Spirits Int’l.  N.V., 623 F.3d 61, 69
(2d Cir.  2010)(“we note that ownership of the relevant trademark is one of the “necessary 
elements .  .  .  of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.”). 
71. Park ‘N Fly, Inc.  v.  Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.  189, 193 (1985).
72. See infra, Part II.A.  See also United Drug Co.  v.  Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S.  90, 97 (1918)(“[t]here is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right 
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is 
employed.” ). 
73. See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1.50
(citing cases and describing state and federal trademark law as “congruent”). 
74. Two Pesos, Inc.  v.  Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.  763, 772-74 (1992).
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article assumes that the public’s gifted designation will otherwise 
meet all of the other common law or statutory requirements to serve 
as an unregistered mark, except that a merchant asserting trademark 
rights in the designation has not actually appropriated the mark by 
using it in commerce. 
A. State Common Law Trademark Rights
The common law as expounded in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition (“Restatement”), states that a trademark must be 
“used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and 
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.”75
However, section 18 of the Restatement provides that the person 
claiming a property interest in the designation does not acquire 
trademark rights until  
  The 
Restatement definition might appear to be consistent with an 
interpretation that a designation’s use by the crowd is sufficient to 
bestow ownership of the mark on a non-using trademark holder. 
Section 9 of the Restatement does not appear to require that the use 
actually be by the mark holder and would appear that the public’s use 
of the designation would be sufficient to accrue trademark rights. 
“the designation has been actually used as a trademark . . . [a] 
designation is ‘used’ as a trademark . . . when the designation 
is displayed or otherwise made known to the prospective 
purchasers in the ordinary course of business in a manner that 
associates the designation with the goods, services, or business 
of the user.”76
The public’s use of a designation to refer to the mark holder’s 
goods is arguably not a use in the ordinary course of business.
   
77  The 
public is not in the “business” nor is the public an agent of the person 
attempting to claim the designation as a mark.78
Finally, section 19 of the Restatement provides for the priority of 
trademark rights.  Section 19 provides that “one who has used a 
designation as a trademark . . . under the rule stated in § 18 has 
 
 75. RESTATEMENT  (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: DEFINITIONS OF 
TRADEMARK AND SERVICE MARK § 9 (1995). 
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION : ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS §
18 (1995). 
78. See Illinois High School Ass’n v.  GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247-48 (7th Cir.
1996). 
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priority in the use of the designation . . . (a) in any geographic areas in 
which the actor has used the designation in good faith or in which the 
designation has become associated with the actor as a result of good 
faith use before the designation is used in good faith [by another].”79
Consequently, under the Restatement’s articulation of the 
common law of trademark, a person asserting rights in a mark must as 
a bare minimum prove that he or she appropriated the designation by 
the actual bona fide use of the mark in commerce.
 
Section 19 presupposes, first, that the use of the mark meets the 
requirements of section 18, and then it imposes the additional 
requirement that the mark is actually used by the person asserting a 
priority in the claimed mark. 
80  The language of 
the Restatement does not appear to be susceptible to an 
interpretation that the mere use by the public as a designation is a 
constructive use in the ordinary course of business by the person 
claiming trademark rights in the designation.81  There is no common 
law doctrine of constructive trademark use. 82   Federal courts 
interpreting the common law of trademark have held that “[t]o 
acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have invented 
the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming 
ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in 
connection with the sale of goods or services.”83
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: PRIORITY OF RIGHTS § 19 
(1995). 
 
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS §
18; Buying For The Home, LLC v.  Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F.  Supp.  2d 310, 327 
(D.N.J.  2006).  But see Peter M.  Brody, What’s in a Nickname? Or, Can Public use Create 
Private Rights?, 95 TRADEMARK REP.  1123, 1145 (2005) (suggesting that the court has 
found de facto constructive trademark use for the purpose of standing to oppose a 
trademark registration). 
 81. Cf.  Aktieselskabet AF 21.  November 2001 v.  Fame Jeans, Inc. 
525 F.3d 8, 20 (C.A.D.C.  2008)(“At common law, “prior ownership of a mark is only 
established as of the first actual use of a mark in a genuine commercial 
transaction.”)(citation omitted); Tally-Ho, Inc.  v.  Coast Community College Dist., 889 
F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir.  1989) (citing United States v.  Steffens, 100 U.S.  82, 85, (1879)).
82. See LOUIS ALTMAN AND MALLA POLLACK, 4A CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP.,
TR.  & MONO.  § 26:4 (4th ed.); Beverly W.  Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act At 
Fifty — Some History And Comment, 86 TRADEMARK REP.  442, 447 (1996); but see Nat’l 
Cable  v.  Am.  Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed.  Cir.  1991). 
83. Sengoku Works Ltd.  v.  RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir.  1996).  See
generally 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COmpetition § 16:1 (4th ed.). 
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B. Federal Unregistered Trademark Rights
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects unregistered
trademarks from uses in interstate and foreign commerce that are 
likely to cause consumer confusion.84  Federal registration of a mark 
under the Lanham Act is merely federal recognition of trademark 
rights that are already possessed by the registrant.85  The Lanham Act 
provides that a person must use a designation in interstate commerce 
to distinguish, identify, and indicate the source of his or her goods in 
order to obtain trademark rights.86  Mere use of a designation by 
members of the public is probably insufficient use to obtain federal 
trademark rights by the referent-mark-holder.87
There is some debate regarding the proper interpretation of “use 
in commerce” for the purposes of trademark infringement under 
section 32(1) of the Lanham Act (registered marks) and section 43(a) 
(unregistered marks).
 
88  This debate may also be critical to the proper 
understanding of the term “use in commerce’ under section 43(c)(1) 
of the Lanham Act (trademark dilution). 89   Whether “use in 
commerce” means any commercial use that Congress could 
constitutionally regulate under the commerce clause90
84. Id.  at 780; Dastar Corp.  v.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.  23, 29-
30 (2003).  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also contains a broad cause of action against 
various forms of unfair competition usually involving some form of consumer deception. 
McCarthy § 1.9.  There is no requirement for trademark ownership to bring an unfair 
competition claim.  See Exxon Corp.  v.  Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 96, 103 
(5th Cir.  1982). 
 or has the much 
narrower definition provided in section 45 of the Lanham Act may be 
critical in future trademark disputes.  The public use of a designation 
in this context is comprised of two types of use, the first being the 
public’s use of a designation to describe goods or services. Whether 
Congress could lawfully regulate private consumer speech in a 
85. See Graeme B.  Dinwoodie, Lessons From The Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA 
L. REV.  1703, 1710-11 (2007), but see 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed.) (“[The Lanham Act] does not say that the applicant must
also qualify for state common law protection.  That coincidentally, the applicant will
usually also meet common law standards is beside the point.”).  See generally 15 U.S.C.  §
1126(e) (2006)(U.S.  trademark registration based on a foreign trademark registration).
86. 15 U.S.C.  § 1127 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C.  1051(b) & 1051(d) (2006).
87. See Continental Corrugated Container Corp.  v.  Continental Group, Inc., 462 F.
Supp.  200, 204 (S.D.N.Y.  1978) (“It is doubtful, then, whether a manufacturer can claim 
protection for an abbreviation of a trademark that it has never formally used.”). 
88. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 414-15 (succinctly summarizing the debate).
89. This quandary will not be further addressed in Part V, trademark dilution.
90. See 15 U.S.C.  §1127 (2006)(“The word ‘commerce’ [under the Lanham Act]
means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”). 
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commercial transaction is problematic and troubling for First 
Amendment scholars, but under the eommerce elause, an extremely 
narrowly tailored law is probably permissible.91
So, if the activity of public use is one that Congress could lawfully 
regulate, then the public’s use of a designation may be recognized as a 
use in commerce under the Lanham Act.  However, if the narrower 
definition of “use in commerce” in section 45 of the Lanham Act is 
controlling, then the public’s use in commerce must also be a “bona 
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade.” 
 
92  Clearly, use by 
the general public, even among actual consumers to designate a 
product, is not a commercial use by the referent-mark holder in the 
ordinary course of trade.  So, this element to obtain trademark rights 
fails unless the referent-mark holder actually uses the public 
designation in commerce.  Absent a use in commerce, there is no 
trademark, and consequently, no legal rights in a mark; therefore, 
there is no ownership of a mark by an entity not using the designation 
in commerce.93
Under the Lanham Act, the requirement to actually have a bona 
fide use of the mark in commerce is made clear in the distinction 
between the use and the intent-to-use basis for an application for 
trademark registration.  Section 1(b)(4)(c) of the Lanham Act 
provides that an “applicant who has made use of the mark in 
commerce” may claim the benefits of a use based trademark 
 
91. But cf.  National Federation of Independent Business v.  Sebelius, 132 S.Ct.
2566, 2587-89(2012)(Roberts, C.J.) & 132 S.Ct.  at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito, J.J.  dissenting)(although these four justices join in the dissent, and they did not join 
in Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion, which four justices did not join on the 
Commerce Clause issue, there appears to be consensus of five justices on a narrower 
judicial interpretation of which non-commercial activities have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause). 
92. See 15 U.S.C.  §1127 (“The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.  
For purposes of this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce-- (1) on goods 
when-- (A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays 
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods 
makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or 
their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and (2) on services 
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are 
rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the 
United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in 
commerce in connection with the services.”) (emphasis supplied). 
93. See Jim Henson Productions, Inc.  v.  John T.  Brady & Associates, 867 F.  Supp.
175, 182 (S.D.N.Y.   1994)(citing Hanover Star Milling Co.  v.  Metcalf, 240 U.S.  403 
(1916)). 
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application.94  Accordingly, if the merchant asserting an interest in the 
public designation associated with its goods or services lacks a 
common law interest in the designation based on its own actual use in 
commerce in connection with the sale of goods or services, there 
would be no basis for a federal registration of that interest.  One 
exception is an intent-to-use (ITU) application, which does not grant 
substantive federal trademark rights until the designation is actually 
used as a mark in commerce by the entity claiming the mark.95
C. Public use Doctrine
 
As previously discussed, there is no statutory or common-law
basis for protecting a designation that has not been appropriated by a 
merchant as a trademark through the merchant’s own (or an agent’s) 
bona fide use in commerce.96  Courts are sometimes faced with the 
dilemma of either forbidding a competitor’s bad faith use of a public 
designation in a manner that creates a likelihood of consumer 
confusion or holding fast to the first-in-time, first-in-right, principles 
of trademark law.  In balancing the interests of the bad faith user of a 
public designation and the interest of the public and the merchant to 
prevent the likelihood of consumer confusion, the merchant and the 
public usually wins.97  This has been called the public use doctrine.98
The case law underlying the public use doctrine often involves 
nicknames or abbreviations of well-known marks.
 
99  Many of these 
nicknames were similar in commercial impression to the actual 
trademark, for example COKE for Coca-Cola.100
94. 15 U.S.C.  § 1051(c) (2006).
  In most of these 
95. See McCarthy, supra note 85 at § 19:29.  In the alternative, trademark registration
and the associated rights may be based on a foreign trademark registration.  Lanham Act 
of 1946 § 44(e), 15 U.S.C.  §1126(e) (2006). 
96. See George & Co, LLC v.  Imagination Entm’t Lt’d., 575 F.3d 383, 403 (4th Cir.
2009). 
97. Id.  (citing 1 J.  THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:18 (3d ed.  1992)).  For example, trademark equitable defenses 
such as laches or acquiescence permit the infringer to continue to use the infringed mark 
despite a likelihood of consumer confusion because of the failure to act by the mark 
holder, and of course, if the mark owner engaged in inequitable conduct, the doctrine of 
clean hands may preclude an equitable remedy against the infringer. 
98. Brody, supra note 80 at 1125.  Mr.  Brody must be credited with pulling together
the threads of disparate common law cases and weaving them into a coherent body of 
trademark principles that he then called the “public use rule.” Id.  at 1126.  The first 
judicial recognition of Brody’s public use rule was by the Fourth Circuit in George & Co 
under the rubric of the public use doctrine.  See George & Co, LLC., 575 F.3d at 403. 
99. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1123-24.
100. See generally Brody, supra note 80; McCarthy, supra note 97, at § 7:18.
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cases, the court could have or actually did rule on the narrow grounds 
that the mark in question was confusingly similar under a theory of 
unfair competition. Then the court could expound on principles which 
ultimately underlay the theory of the public use doctrine in dicta. 
These confusingly similar mark lines of cases are not helpful on the 
broader issue of adjudicating rights in a public designation that is not 
commercially confusingly similar to the underlying trademark  (for 
example, MICKEY D’s for McDonalds or BIG BLUE for IBM).  So, 
the public use doctrine may not be helpful in analyzing the publicly 
coined designations that are a focus of this article because they are 
designations that are not per-se confusingly similar to the senior 
mark.  However, as some courts or scholars may apply the public use 
doctrine to these non-confusingly similar designations that a 
competitor may attempt to adopt as a trademark, a further discussion 
of jurisprudential limitations on the public use doctrine is warranted. 
1. History of the Public use doctrine
Case law only weakly supports the public use doctrine.  The
seminal article on the public use doctrine traces its use back to Coca-
Cola, Co. v. Koke Co. of America, which involved Coca-Cola 
litigating a series of cases against different defendants regarding 
rights associated with one of the world’s most famous trademarks, the 
COKE trademark.101  In the Koke Co. case, Koke Co. adopted KOKE 
as a trademark in bad fait 102   Unfortunately, Koke Co. never 
challenged Coca-Cola’s right to the COKE mark, and the courts 
assumed that without explicit analysis of this issue, that the 
designation Coke was a mark and the rights to COKE belonged to the 
Coca-Cola Company.103  The judicial gloss on this case focused on 
principles of unfair competition, protection of the consumer, and 
punishment of inequitable conduct.  The court did not address 
traditional trademark infringement under the likelihood of consumer 
standards.104
In later litigation, courts more explicitly associated the Coke 
designation with Coca-Cola’s goodwill and stopped Coca-Cola’s 
 
101. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1126-27.
102. Koke Co.  of America v.  Coca-Cola Co., 255 F.  894, 895 (9th Cir.  1919), rev’d on
other grounds, 254 U.S.  143 (1920). 
103. Brody, supra note 80, at 1127.  There is no explanation for why these issues were
not raised except that the courts may have found the dispute regarding whether the 
presence of cocaine or the lack thereof in the Coca-Cola syrup deceived the public and 
should bar Coca-Cola’s action a more interesting topic of discussion. 
104. Id.
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competitors from using phonetically similar marks such as LA COQ105 
or KOKE-UP.106  In the case involving the LA COQ mark, the court 
went one step further from the solid grounding of unfair competition 
law; instead, they opined in dicta that under trademark law that Coca-
Cola had an exclusive right to the designation Coke as an 
abbreviation of its COCA-COLA mark despite its failure to use the 
designation as a trademark.107
Finally, in Coca-Cola v. Busch, the court found that the 
defendant’s use of the mark KOKE-UP would deceive the public. 
For the first time, a court explicitly noted that the nickname Coke was 
given to the product solely by the public and had not yet been 
appropriated by the Coca-Cola Co.
 
108  The court started its analysis 
stating that the precedent was “rather few and on the whole not 
altogether satisfactory.”109  The Busch court looked to three English 
cases, which at least from the court’s abbreviated summaries of them 
do not appear to be directly on point.110  The court then observed 
“[t]he American cases are few in number and some while seemingly 
opposed to the view here adopted, upon careful examination, review 
no inconsistency with the position here taken.” 111   The three 
American cases that the court relied on seemed to focus almost 
entirely on questions of secondary meaning or unfair competition. 
The Busch court then explicitly held without explaining its 
justification for extending existing law on what the court 
acknowledged was a problematic precedent that “the abbreviation of 
the trade-mark which the public has used and adopted as designating 
the product of the complaint is equally as much to be protected as the 
trademark itself,”112 and under the common law, there would be no 
trademark infringement and that remedy, if any, would be due to the 
principles of unfair competition.113
105. Coca-Cola Co.  v.  Christopher, 37 F.  Supp.  216 (E.D.  Mich.  1941).
 
106. Coca-Cola Co.  v.  Busch, 44 F.  Supp.  405, 408 (D.  Pa.  1942).
107. Id.
108. Brody, supra note 80, at 1129.
109. Busch, 44 F.  Supp.  408.
110. Id.
111. Id.  at 409.
112. Id.  at 410.
113. See Id.  at 407; see also id.  at 411 (“the proof clearly indicates the intention to
palm off the defendant's product as that of the plaintiff, and it seems to me to permit the 
defendant to so do would be unconscionable and would be lending the weight of a court of 
equity to a deceptive matter”). 
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Significantly, none of the Coca-Cola cases address the fact that 
Coca-Cola attempted to discourage the use of the designation Coke 
by the public when referring to its product.114  It was not until 1941 
when the designation Coke was so well established in the minds of the 
consuming public that Coca-Cola formally began to appropriate the 
Coke designation as a trademark. 115   Arguably, by discouraging 
consumer use, Coca-Cola abandoned whatever rights it may have 
possessed in the mark as bestowed by the public and Coca-Cola’s 
trademark rights affirmatively began when it commenced using the 
COKE mark in June 1941.116  However, these interesting issues were 
not litigated, or at least played no role in the different published 
opinions.117
The public use doctrine sat quietly in an inchoate form for 
another thirty-five years.  Starting in the late 1960s, Volkswagen 
litigated a series of cases involving the public’s designation of Bug to 
refer to the iconic Volkswagen Beetle automobile.
 
118  Because it 
resembled a ladybug or a beetle, the American public quickly applied 
the designation Bug to the Volkswagen Beetle automobile after its 
initial importation into the United States.  Volkswagen itself did not 
initially appropriate the designation Bug; however, independent 
Volkswagen automobile dealers used the Bug designation in 
advertisements and in dealership trade names.119  This limited use by 
Volkswagen dealers was not legally significant as a trademark use in 
commerce.  Under the court interpretations of trademark law in 
effect at the time, the mark had to be affixed to the goods so a 
Volkswagen dealer’s use of the Bug designation would be sufficient to 
support a claim of unfair competition, but not to create positive 
trademark rights in the designation as a trademark for automobiles.120
114. Brody, supra note 73, at 1130.
 
Furthermore, there was no discussion in the cases regarding whether 
these commercial uses by Volkswagen and its dealers were sufficient 
115. Id.  at 1131.
116. Id.  at 1130-31.  Arguably, Coca-Cola’s counter advertising constituted
abandonment of the designation Coke or at least whatever theoretical rights that the 
public had created in designation as a mark for Coca-Cola.  Cf.  Beech-Nut Packing Co.  v.  
P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S.  629, 632 (1927); See also Russell V.  Caroline-Becker, Inc., 142
N.E.2d 899, 902 (Mass.  1957); McCarthy, supra note 97 at 17:3.
117. Brody, supra note 80, at 1131.
118. Id.  at 1132-37.
119. Id.  at 1133.
120. Id.  at 1133 n.  45.
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to create rights in the Bug designation as a service mark for 
Volkswagen dealers or Volkswagen automobile repair services.121
While the trial court’s opinion in Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard contained an extensive discussion of 
secondary meaning and the factual basis for the strong commercial 
strength of the Bug designation,
 
122
Moreover, it is unclear under which section of the Lanham Act or 
other law Volkswagen brought its trademark claims for infringement 
of its unregistered trademarks.  The trial court opined that it had 
jurisdiction under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, which protects 
only federal registered trademarks, and also under United States 
(Paris Convention) treaty obligations to protect a foreign national 
against unfair competition.
 secondary meaning, even 
extraordinarily strongly acquired commercial secondary meaning, is 
merely one element to determine whether a designation may 
constitute a legally protectable mark and is not dispositive on the 
question of who actually owns the mark.  The court did not engage in 
the analysis necessary to support a finding that absent commercial use 
by Volkswagen, the designation Bug was indeed a protected 
trademark owned by Volkswagen. 
123  But it is unclear on which section of the 
Lanham Act (or other federal law) that the court relied on to reach 
the issue of the Bug designation, because the trial court failed to cite 
to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which protects unregistered 
marks as a claim, or to state an alternative basis on which the court 
asserted jurisdiction.124
On appeal, the circuit court succinctly summarized the trial 
court’s analysis: 
  
The district court specifically found that ‘prior to defendant’s 
commencement of business under the trade name ‘The Bug 
Shop’, ‘Bug’ had acquired a strong secondary meaning in the 
automotive field referring to plaintiff and the products and 
services marketed in the United States through the 
Volkswagen organization.’ The secondary meaning doctrine 
121. Id.
122. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.  Rickard, 175 U.S.P.Q.  563, 565.  (N.D.
Tex.  1972), modified and aff’d, 492 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.  1974). 
123. But see In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed.  Cir.   2005) (holding the Paris
Convention is not a self-executing treaty).
124. A reasonable reading of the case and by a simple process of elimination suggests
that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was indeed the alternative basis for the court’s
jurisdiction.
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referred to by the court holds that words which have a 
primary meaning of their own, such as bug, may by long used 
in connection with a particular product, come to be known by 
the public as specifically designating that product. Thus in the 
judgment of the trial court, the word ‘bug’ as used in the 
automotive field had become so associated with the 
Volkswagen that [Volkswagen] was entitled to trademark 
rights in the word.125
The appellate court did briefly mention the use of the designation 
Bug in Volkswagen’s own advertisements for many years.
 
126
Perhaps the best case supporting the public use doctrine in the 
Volkswagen Bug line of cases is Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Hoffman.
  
However, as the quotation shows, there was no detailed discussion of 
Volkswagen’s use or appropriation of the designation Bug.  One may 
assume that whatever Volkswagen’s actual use in commerce was, that 
use may have been sufficient commercial use to appropriate the 
designation. 
127 Hoffman involves another independent repair service 
using the designation Bug to identify its business of servicing 
Volkswagen sedans.  Hoffman is distinguishable from prior cases 
because by this point in time Volkswagen had registered BUG as a 
service mark128  However, Hoffman’s use of the mark BUG predated 
Volkswagen’s service mark registration.  The court had to determine 
whether under the senior user defense Volkswagen had developed 
common law trademark rights in the BUG mark.129
In what is arguably the first clear modern (post-Lanham Act) 
articulation of the public use doctrine, the Hoffman court stated, “[a] 
word can also develop secondary meaning by public usage of the 
word to designate a particular product.  Thus, a nickname for a 
  The court then 
discussed Volkswagen’s massive advertising use of the designation 
Bug and found that the term had acquired secondary meaning to 
designate the Volkswagen Beetle sedan prior to Hoffman’s first use in 
commerce of the term BUG. 
125. Rickard, 492 F.2d at 477 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id.  at 478.
127. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.  Hoffman, 489 F.  Supp.  678 (D.S.C.
1980). 
128. Id.  at 681.
129. See Id.  at 681-82.  Cf.  GTE Corp.  v.  Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir.
1990)(Tea Rose-Rectanus Senior User Defense).  See also Lanham Act §33(b)(5), 15 
U.S.C.  §1115(b)(5) (2006). 
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product is protectable as a trademark if the owner of the product 
adopts it or allows the public to use it without protest.”130  The first 
part of the quote is a mere restatement of a well-established black 
letter law principle that public use can create secondary meaning.  It 
is black letter law that the secondary meaning is measured from the 
perspective of the consuming public.131  However, the second part 
conflates two distinct seminal trademark concepts: the requirement of 
secondary meaning and the requirement of its use in commerce.132
Hoffman is nuanced in that the court recognized that if a business 
attempts to discourage the public’s use of the designation, then that 
business should not later be able to claim the designation based on 
the public’s prior use of the designation.
 
The court did not address the issues of appropriation or use of the 
public’s designation by the entity claiming the public designation.  To 
properly complete its analysis, the court would have needed to 
demonstrate in its legal analysis that the public’s use is legally a use in 
commerce that was sufficiently used to convey trademark rights to a 
private entity. 
133  However, in the published 
opinion the legal basis for this conclusion is unclear.  At the very 
least, a court may reach this position either on the grounds that the 
entity claiming the mark had abandoned any possible legal claim to 
the mark or, in the alternative, on principles of estoppel and equity 
practice.134  Justice and equity will not reward a party for taking the 
position of the proverbial dog in a manger. 135   The maxim of 
trademark law is “use it or lose it.” However, because the purpose of 
unfair competition law is broader than that of trademark law, it is 
unclear whether this rule should apply to claims of unfair 
competition.136
130. Hoffman, 489 F.  Supp.  at 681.  The Lanham Act was enacted July 6, 1946, and
Coca-Cola Co.  v.  Busch, 44 F.  Supp.  405, 408 (D.  Pa.  1942) is a 1942 case. 
  The goal of the law of unfair competition is more than 
131. McCarthy, supra note 83 at 15:5.
132. See Int’l Bancorp, LLC v.  Societe Des Bains De Mer et Du Cercle des Estrangers
A Monaco, 329 F.3d.  359, 363-64 (4th Cir.  2003). 
133. Hoffman, 489 F.  Supp.  at 681; see also George & Co, LLC v.  Imagination
Entm’t Lt’d., 575 F.3d 383, 404 (4th Cir.  2009). 
134. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1135-36.
135. See Amoskeag Mfg.  Co.  v.  Garner, 6 Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  265, 270 (1869)(“This is a
sort of a dog in the manger policy, which courts of equity will not enforce.  Corporations 
and vast monopolies must be protected in their legal and well ascertained rights, but it is 
not incumbent upon courts of equity to prevent others from doing what corporations and 
monopolies have failed to do, and do not do, simply because they prefer not to do it.”); 
Gilliam v.  Quinlan, 608 F.  Supp.  823, 829 n.  3(D.C.N.Y 1985). 
136. See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:7 (4th ed.);
see also MCCARTHY §§ 1:8-9. 
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the mere protection of the goodwill of a single company or the 
prevention of consumer deception.  Rather, the goal of unfair 
competition law is the protection of the integrity of the marketplace 
and its participants.137
The next line of cases involved the designation Hog to refer to 
Harley-Davidson motorcycles.  Like Coca-Cola, Harley-Davidson 
had initially discouraged the use of a publicly coined designation, in 
this case the Hog public designation.
 
138  In the first case discussing the 
designation Hog, Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Seghieri, the court stated, 
“Plaintiff contends that since at least the early 1950’s, the public has 
referred to Harley-Davidson motorcycles, and no other brand of 
motorcycles, as ‘Hogs.’” 139
The “HOG” trademark was first registered in April of 1988 
and was first used in conjunction with motorcycle parts in 
1986.  Prior to 1986, the “HOG” designation was used in 
conjunction with a variety of items, including clocks, watches, 
jewelry, ashtrays, belt buckles, greeting cards, posters and 
letters, beginning in 1983.
  However, the court recounts a more 
specific factual statement: 
140
The defendant’s first use of the HOG FARM mark in commerce 
occurred in 1986.141  So, it is not clear that the court’s conclusion relied 
on the public’s use of the Hog designation.142
137. Id.  at §§ 1:8-9.  But see Exxon Corp.  v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc.  695 F.2d
96, 103-04 (5th Cir.  1982)(rejecting an unfair competition claim involving an abandoned 
mark with significant commercial residual goodwill). 
  A closer reading of 
Seghieri suggests that the mention of the public’s use of the 
designation Hog related to whether the designation Hog had become 
generic and not to the basis on which to find the use of the 
designation as constituting trademark appropriation. 
138. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1138.
139. Harley-Davidson, Inc.  v.  Seghieri, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1956, 1957 (N.D.  Cal.  1993).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.  at 1958.  (“Plaintiff has clearly established prior use of the mark -- prior both
to its own registration of the mark and prior to Defendants’ use of the mark.  Although it 
is true that Defendants’ business was established prior to Plaintiff’s registration of the 
name “HOG”, the evidence establishes that it was Plaintiff who established prior use of 
the term “hog”, both nationally and locally in San Jose, California.”). 
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Unlike the Coca-Cola cases, at least one court has found that the 
designation Hog had become generic for a type of large motorcycle.143 
In Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, the court found that the 
designation Hog was generic for large motorcycles. 144   Harley-
Davidson attempted to rely on the public’s use of the designation 
Hog to refer to Harley-Davidson motorcycles prior to its adoption of 
the designation Hog, in order to achieve an earlier priority date based 
on the public’s use first use as a designation in commerce.  The 
Grottanelli court cited to National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. 
American Cinema Editors, Inc. 145  (mark “ACE”), and 
Volkswagenwerk AG v. Hoffman 146  (mark “BUG”) for the 
proposition that the public’s use of a designation may “accord a 
company priority as to its subsequent trademark use of a term.”147 
The Grottanelli court declined to opine on this issue, holding that 
“[t]he public has no more right than a manufacturer to withdraw from 
the language a generic term, already applicable to the relevant 
category of products, and accord it trademark significance, at least as 
long as the term retains some generic meaning.”148
Finally, in 1999, a federal appellate court recognized the public 
use doctrine in the context of a trademark infringement action.
  So, with a wink to 
the cases recognizing the public’s use of the designation as granting 
trademark rights, the court declined the apply these cases and 
resolved the dispute largely on the separate issue of genericism. 
149  In 
Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., the court was 
called upon to determine who owned the mark ST. LOUIS RAMS.150 
The defendant, the Los Angeles Rams football team, sought to 
relocate to St. Louis, Missouri in pursuit of playing in a better climate.  
The sports media was abuzz with stories regarding the relocation of 
the team.  Though the move was announced in January 1995, the 
Rams did not begin to use the mark ST. LOUIS RAMS in commerce 
until April 1995.151
143. Harley Davidson, Inc.  v.  Grottanelli, 164 F.2d.  806, 810-11 (2d Cir.  1999), but
see Seghieri, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1957 (finding that trademark HOG was not generic). 
  As the Los Angeles Rams prepared to use the St. 
144. Grottanelli, 164 F.2d.  at 810-11.
145. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc.  v.  American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572 (Fed.  Cir.  1991). 
146. Hoffman, 489 F.  Supp.at 678.
147. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d at 812.
148. Id.  at 812.
149. Brody, supra note 80, at 1140 (citing Johnny Blastoff, Inc.  v.  Los Angeles Rams
Football Co., 188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir.  1999)). 
150. Johnny Blastoff, Inc., 188 F.3d at 431.
151. Id.  at 430.
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Louis Rams designation as their new trademark, the plaintiff, Johnny 
Blastoff, Inc., a business engaged in creating and marketing cartoons, 
filed for and received a Wisconsin trademark registration in February 
1995 for ST. LOUIS RAMS, and then filed an intent-to-use 
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office one 
month later.152
The question before the Johnny Blastoff court was when the 
Rams football franchise acquired a protectable interest in the 
disputed ST. LOUIS RAMS trademark.  The court stated “[f]or the 
purpose of establishing public identification of a mark with a product 
or service, the fact-finder may rely on the use of the mark in 
“advertising brochures, catalogs, newspaper ads, and articles in 




In addition, courts have recognized that ‘abbreviations and 
nicknames of trademarks or names used only by the public 
give rise to protectable rights in the owners of the trade name 
or mark which the public modified.’ Such public use of a mark 
is deemed to be on behalf of the mark’s owners.
  The court then went on to state: 
154
Tellingly, the Federal Circuit case to which the Johnny Blastoff 
court cited was an appeal from a trademark cancellation decision of 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  In response to the 
appellant-registrant’s objection that the party opposing the trademark 
registration (“opposer”) had not shown sufficient use to have rights to 
oppose the registration of the mark, the Federal Circuit stated “[i]t is 
not required that [the opposer] meet the technical statutory 
requirements to register [a] mark . . . in order for [the opposer] to 
have a basis for objection to another’s registration.”155
152. Id.
  So the case 
that merely stands for the proposition that public use of a designation 
may grant grounds that provide standing to oppose a trademark 
registration. 
153. Id.  (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
154. Id.  (quoting Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n.  v.  Am.  Cinema Editors, Inc., 937
F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed.  Cir.  1991))(emphasis in original).  Cf.  3 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:52 (4th ed.)  (trademark use by licensees
that creates goodwill inures to the benefit of the trademark holder).
155. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v.  American Cinema Editors, Inc.  937 F.2d 1572,
1578 (Fed.  Cir.  1991). 
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 Standing in trademark law in an administrative proceeding is not 
the same as Article III case or controversy standing under the 
Constitution.156  Standing to oppose a trademark registration merely 
requires that the party has a real interest in the proceedings and that 
the party possess a reasonable belief that it may be damaged by the 
trademark registration.157  It is not the same as standing under Article 
III of the Constitution.  The burden is much lower.158  The party is not 
required to have a specific commercial interest, not shared by the 
general public.159  In Ritchie v. Orenthal James Simpson, the court held 
that Mr. Ritchie’s interest in a “belief in a loving and nurturing 
relationship between husband and wife and the allegation that the 
[OJ SIMPSON] marks are synonymous with wife-beater and wife-
murder” was sufficient to confer standing on him to oppose a 
trademark registration.160  The second element is a reasonable belief 
that the registration would damage the opposing party.161  One way of 
showing that a party has a reasonable belief that it would be damaged 
is by showing that it possesses a relevant trait or characteristic that is 
implicated by the proposed trademark.162
The Johnny Blastoff court, without analysis or even 
acknowledging the distinction between the right to oppose a 
trademark registration or petition for cancellation and the positive 
trademark rights in the mark, extended this narrow holding.  This 
holding on a technical question of trademark prosecution was then 
used to create support for a novel extension of trademark law that a 
use by the public creates positive trademark rights, and the public’s 
non-commercial use inures to the benefit of the referent-mark holder 
as if it were an actual use in commerce.   
  The holders of referent-
marks will possess all the rights of the general public to prevent the 
registration of confusingly similar marks as well as having a specific 
commercial interest in the specific trademark registration.  
Furthermore, since the holders possess a relevant characteristic, the 
potential registration of the designation may affect the economic 
value of their mark. 
156. 170 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (Fed.  Cir.  1999).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.  at 1096-97.
160. Id.  at 1097.
161. Id.  at 1097-98.
162. Id.  at 1098.
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Moreover, it is unclear whether the Johnny Blastoff court needed 
to reach any of these issues.  Disregarding the public use doctrine, the 
use of the mark RAMS in connection with any sporting goods or 
associated consumer products still would have probably caused a 
likelihood of consumer confusion.163  Under the trademark doctrine of 
tacking, a mark owner can assert rights in a new mark with the same 
commercial impression based on its first use in commerce of a prior 
mark.164  The focus of the commercial impression of the marks LOS 
ANGELES RAMS and ST. LOUIS RAMS is on the word RAMS, so 
this would be an excellent case for the court to find tacking.165 
Alternatively, the court could have rested its decision regarding 
senior user rights based on the Rams’s own offering for sale of season 
tickets that predated Blastoff’s first use of the mark in commerce.166
Perhaps the best case supporting the public use doctrine in the 
context of a trademark infringement action is George & Co., LLC v. 
Imagination Entertainment Ltd.
 
So while the language of the Johnny Blastoff case is strongly 
encouraging for proponents of the Public use doctrine, it does not 
provide the rigorous analysis that is required to place a public use 
right on solid doctrinal footing and to justify disregarding common 
law and Lanham Act requirements of a use in commerce as an 
essential element for trademark ownership. 
167   In George & Co., plaintiff 
attempted to use the Public use doctrine as a defense against 
trademark abandonment. 168
163. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc.  v.  Metro.  Baltimore Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410,
413 (7th Cir.  1994). 
George & Co. court grudgingly 
recognized a narrow definition of the marks eligible for protection 
under the Public use doctrine.  “The Public use doctrine, which is 
extremely limited in scope, states that abbreviations or nicknames 
used only by the public can give rise to protectable trademark rights 
164. See Data Concepts, Inc.  v.  Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir.
1998) (“The use of an earlier mark can be tacked onto the use of a subsequent mark only 
if the previously used mark is “the legal equivalent of the mark in question or 
indistinguishable therefrom” such that consumers “consider both as the same mark.”). 
165. For example, the Rams franchise disclaimed the use of “St.  Louis” apart from
the word mark “ST.  LOUIS RAMS.” See Registration No.  3256433, available at 
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4005:jb2n0.2.1.  They also disclaimed 
“Los Angeles” except as part of the “LOS ANGELES RAMS.” See Registration No.  
0971047, available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4005:jb2n0.9.13. 
166. See Johnny Blastoff, Inc., 188 F.3d at 431-32 (by early February 1995, over 72,000
season tickets were sold). 
167. George & Co., LLC v.  Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir.  2009).
168. Id.  at 403.
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to the owner of a mark which the public has modified.”169  The word 
“nickname” could be read broadly enough to encompass entirely new 
names, such as the designation Mickey D for McDonalds or Tarzhay 
for Target.  However, the examples given by the court are all 
confusingly similar abbreviations such as BUD for BUDWEISER or 
COKE for COCA-COLA. 170   This suggests that the preferred 
interpretation of the term “nickname” is narrower interpretation, and 
perhaps, that the George & Co. court was only prepared to 
recognized abbreviations that were in themselves colorable imitations 
of the referent-mark holder’s mark.  The court also noted that the 
Public use doctrine had been used in the franchise context citing the 
Johnny Blastoff, Inc. case.  As discussed earlier in this Article, in the 
context of the Johnny Blastoff, Inc. case the George & Co. court also 
relied on was the Federal Circuit’s National Cable Television case, 
which considered only the public’s use of a designation as a ground 
that established standing for filing an opposition to trademark 
registration and not as an affirmative ground on which to create new 
trademark rights.171
The George & Co. court limited the public use doctrine to well-
known brands.  Significantly for this article, the court held that the 
doctrine was limited only to an abbreviation or shortening of the 
mark and did not apply to elongations of a mark.
 
172  So, starting from 
COCA-COLA, the public may create the mark COKE under the 
public use doctrine.  But the public could not create a protectable 
COCA-COLA designation starting from the COKE mark.  This anti-
elongation rule was not based on citation to legal authority.  Rather, 
it was based on an exiguous discussion of how the court viewed the 
use of designations and trademarks by consumers in the 
marketplace.173  Second, the court held that “the Public use doctrine 
does not provide trademark protection where the owner of the mark 
fails to continue to use the mark.”174
169. Id.
  For this proposition, the court 
relied on Grottanelli, where Harley-Davidson deliberately resisted 
170. Id.
171. See Part II.A.1 & Part III.
172. George & Co, LLC., 575 F.3d at 403-04.
173. Id.  (“Coke and Bud clearly add distinctiveness to their respective marks.  In 
contrast, an elongation does not add distinctiveness to a mark.  “Peanut Butter & Jelly” 
certainly does not make “PB & J” more distinctive.  The same can be said of “Bacon, 
Lettuce, and Tomato” and “BLT.””). 
174. Id.  at 404.
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linking the designation Hog to its products.175
The era of public designations percolating among consumers or 
the media for years, decades, or generations before appropriation by 
a competitor is gone.  Crowd-sourced designations will suddenly 
appear and will need to be protected quickly.  From a reading of the 
case law, trademark holders may find that the public use doctrine is 
weakly moored in readily distinguishable cases or in mere dicta, 
which may either not be followed, or if followed, future courts may 
decline to extend the doctrine.   The penumbras of the case law 
suggest that discouraging the use of a public designation weakens the 
referent-mark holder’s ability to protect the public designation, that 
failure to adopt it may also result in the limitation or loss of rights, 
and that the scope of which public designations are eligible for the 
application of the doctrine is also unclear.  Assuming that the public 
use doctrine does exist, as the law currently stands, it provides an 
uncertain foundation on which to build a brand or mark, if, as this 
article posits, the public will be an increasingly significant source for 
valuable trademarks. 
  So even a court that 
was prepared to accept public use as a sufficient use to award a 
protectable interest in a designation required that the referent-mark 
holder must use the mark.  However, in the hypothetical case 
analyzed in this Article, the referent-mark holder is attempting to 
assert rights in a mark that it, itself, had never used. 
2. Public use doctrine elements
The elements of the public use doctrine, as articulated in George
& Co., require that the party claiming its protection to have a well-
known mark which the public has modified into a shortened 
nickname or abbreviation.176
Although the [p]ublic use doctrine appears at odds with the 
bedrock trademark principles that ownership rights flow only 
from the prior appropriation and actual use in the market 
  Public use doctrine may be limited only 
to well-known marks—in fact limited to marks, which border on the 
famous.  As demonstrated earlier in this section, the public use 
doctrine, while a sound doctrine as a prudential matter, has a 
questionable provenance in trademark law.  The only court to 
explicitly recognize the public use doctrine in the trademark 
infringement context stated: 
175. Id.
176. Id.  at 403.
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superior rights are granted to the owner of the mark as 
modified by the public to avoid consumer confusion in the 
market-place.  Because of this tension, the [p]ublic use 
doctrine generally is confined to instances where the public 
modified a well-known brand into a nickname or 
abbreviation.177
If the public use doctrine does exist in trademark law and it is a 
valid exception to the general law of trademarks that requires 
ownership through appropriation and commercial use, then, at best, 
the public use doctrine is an extremely precarious basis on which to 
claim trademark rights for marks that are arguably at least well-
known, if not in fact legally famous and protected against trademark 
dilution. 
 
So far, the public use doctrine has been limited to well-known 
marks. 178
Well-known mark is a term of art in trademark law.  The term 
well-known mark appears in the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”) and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the 
“TRIPS Agreement”).
  The public use doctrine case law revolves around 
designations such as Coke, Bug, and Hog for Cola-Cola, Volkswagen, 
and Harley-Davidson respectively—some of the most prestigious, 
recognized, and valuable brands in the world—famous brands.  The 
extremely limited public use doctrine case law is not clear on what 
constitutes a well-known mark for the purposes of the public use 
doctrine or when a referent-mark has sufficiently achieved such 
renown to earn the status of being a well-known mark for the purpose 
of protection against a competitor’s appropriation of a publicly 
coined designation.  Therefore, it may be useful to consider other 
uses of the term well-known mark in trademark law. 
179
177. Id.  (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  The court then went on to
hold that the public use doctrine did not apply to elongations of a mark merely to 
abbreviations or nicknames. 
Unfortunately, some courts also 
erroneously use the term well-known mark as a synonym for—or 
178. Id.
179. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art.  6 bis, March 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T.  1583, 828 U.N.T.S.  305; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art.  16(2), 1869 U.N.T.S., 33 I.L.M.  (1994); Grupo 
Gigante S.A.  De C.V.  v.  Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.  2004).  See 
also Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13 VAND.  J.  
ENT.  & TECH.  L.  1, 29 (2010). 
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interchangeably with—the trademark term famous-mark. 180
Consequently, the existing case law and scholarly commentary is in 
some state of rhetorical confusion.  As will be discussed later in the 
Article, if the public designation cases are analyzed under modern 
trademark dilution theory, there is no need for a separate public use 
doctrine.181
This section will limit its discussion of well-known marks to the 
term’s commonly understood meaning under trademark law.  Under 
the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, WTO countries are 
required to protect well-known marks, even if that mark is not 
registered or used in that country.
 
182  This scope of trademark rights 
for well-known marks seems roughly analogous to the scope of the 
Public use doctrine where the public designation is protected without 
use by the merchant claiming rights in the mark in order to protect 
the public interest against a likelihood of consumer confusion.183
In ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit commended the “Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks” 
adopted by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the 
attention of New York State’s highest court in its certification of a 
question to the New York State Court of Appeals.
 
184  The WIPO Joint 
Recommendation requires the consideration of the following six 
factors: 
(1) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the
relevant sector of the public; 
180. See ITC Ltd.  v.  Punchgini, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 467, 474 n.  1 (2007).
181. See Part IV.  Also, even if the referent-holder’s marks are merely well known,
they are strong marks and courts have held that  “the stronger the mark, the more likely it 
is that encroachment on it will produce confusion.” See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
§ 24:49 (quoting Champions Golf Club v.  Champions Golf Clubs, 78 F.3d 111 (6th Cir.
1996)).
182. Paris Convention, Art.  6 bis; TRIPS Art.  16(2); Grupo Gigante SA De CV, 391
F.3d at 1099-1100.  See also Leah Chan Grinvald, at 29.
183. Compare generally 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 29:62 (4th ed.) with McCarthy, supra note 97 at § 7:18.
184. Punchgini Inc., 482 F.3d at 168-69.  The WIPO Joint Recommendation is
authoritative because it “has been adopted by both intergovernmental bodies concerned 
with trademark protection: the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) and the Assembly of the Paris Union.” See Empresa Cubana del 
Tabaco v.  Culbro Corp., 2004 U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS 4935 at *101 (S.D.N.Y.  Mar.  26, 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir.  2005), cert.  denied, 547 U.S.  1205 (2006). 
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(2) the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the
mark; 
(3) the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion
of the mark, including advertising or publicity and the presentation, at 
fairs or exhibitions, or the goods and/or services to which the mark 
applies; 
(4) the duration and geographical area of any registrations, and/or
any application for registration, of the mark, to the extent that they 
reflect use or recognition of the mark; 
(5) the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in
particular, the extent to which the mark was recognized as well 
known by competent authorities; [and] 
(6) the value associated with the mark.185
The WIPO Joint Recommendation factors are consistent with the 
case law underlying the public use doctrine that implicitly requires a 
court to weigh the first-in-time, first-in-right principle of trademark 
appropriation against the need to prevent the likelihood of consumer 
confusion.  It also requires a finding that the mark has renown and 
significant commercial value before the scale tips in favor of 
departing from the historical and legal moorings of trademark law. 
Taking the court at its word that only well-known marks are 
protected by the public use doctrine, one may speculate either that 
the public use doctrine is a judicially crafted common law doctrine 
that provided de facto protection to famous (and niche fame) marks 
prior to the formal amendment of the Lanham Act to protect famous 
marks against infringement by dilution,186 or on the spectrum of fame, 
it provides quasi-trademark dilution protection for the almost famous 
mark or soon to be famous mark that does not yet meet the test for 
fame under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.187
185. Punchgini Inc., 482 F.3d at 168-69 (quoting World Intellectual Property
Organization [WIPO], Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Well–Known Marks.  WIPO Doc.  833(E), art.  2(3)(i) (Sept.  1999). 
  “[U]nderstood as an 
expression of the strength and fame of the underlying brand, a 
publicly-coined nickname logically belong[s] to the party that built 
that strong famous brand, for were it not for the brand owner’s 
efforts, there would have been no occasion for the nickname to 
186. The vast majority of Public use doctrine cases predate both The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006.  See 
generally Brody, supra note 73 (discussing the cases that coalesced into the pulic use 
doctrine). 
187. See infra Part IV, discussing trademark dilution.
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arise.”188  If this is true as the justification for the public use doctrine, 
then because federal law now recognizes trademark dilution, the only 
remaining statutory or common law justification for the public use 
doctrine is the protection of consumers from the likelihood of 
consumer confusion.  In either case, while the public use doctrine may 
have some potential for a well-known national brand, it likely 
provides little or no potential to support a claim by a local or regional 
brand to a public designation.  As the doctrine is currently 
articulated, there is no reason that a court could not use it to protect 
the almost-famous or the niche-fame marks which are currently not 
protected under the TDRA.189
3. Summary of public use doctrine
  From the perspective of the referent-
mark holder, this may appear to be a good trademark policy 
justification.  However, the creation of a new class of “almost 
famous” marks would conflict with the TDRA, and it may also 
conflict with state laws protecting distinctive marks from trademark 
dilution. 
The public use doctrine is well intentioned and clearly protects
the public’s interest against consumer confusion, so as a matter of 
policy it may be a wise choice—but it is just that, a choice, and one 
that is not dictated out of expediency or the lack of other remedies. 
Unfair competition law also achieves the same result without doing 
needless damage to a fundamental principle of trademark law.190
The case law cited in support of the public use doctrine frequently 
focused on whether the public use had given the mark secondary 
meaning.  Secondary meaning is merely the element of mark 
ownership that shows the designation is capable of serving as a mark.  
Just because a designation is legally capable of functioning as a mark 
does not mean either the designation is a mark or that the designation 
has been appropriated as a mark.  Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc. established a spectrum of distinctiveness for 
  As 
was demonstrated earlier in this section of the article, the public use 
doctrine is based on a weak doctrinal flooring, ambiguous or readily 
distinguishable case law, and clearly conflicts with a well-established 
principle of trademark law that states trademark rights arise only 
through appropriation by use and not by the mere adoption of the 
mark. 
188. See also Brody, supra note 80, at 1153.
189. See Part IV.
190. See Part V.A.
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trademark and their eligibility for trademark protection without a 
showing of secondary meaning. 191   There are three classes of 
trademarks—arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks—that are 
technical trademarks and are legally presumed to be inherently 
distinctive and do not require separate proof of sescondary 
meaning.192
Yet, even though these three classes of marks are immediately 
legally protectable upon bona fide use in commerce, the mark must 
first be used in commerce before the trademark user has ownership of 
the mark.  The two cases that impute the public’s use of the 
designation as a commercial use by the referent-mark holder have not 
articulated any legal basis for this conclusion and for departing from 
over a century of statutory and common law.  The public is not the 
referent-mark holder’s agent, and there is no legal relationship 
between the two.  This is a major failing of the public use doctrine.  It 
protects a public designation as mark and grants trademark rights to 
the referent-mark holder without actual use by the party claiming 
ownership of the designation.  Until the public use doctrine is more 
robustly theorized and moored in a well-reasoned and well-
articulated body of case law, the public use doctrine remains at best 
the last arrow in the quiver of a negligent mark holder seeking 
protection from a competitor’s first appropriation of the mark.   
 
Like the ownership of the fox in Pierson v. Post, hunting is not 
enough, pursuit is not enough, even wounding is not enough, the fox 
must actually be taken before the hunter obtains a property 
interest.193
191. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.  v.  Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2nd Cir.
1976). 
  In the public use doctrine cases, the hunter is not even 
chasing the fox, the hunter is watching the fox frolic in the woods, or 
is even oblivious to its existence until another hunter attempts to take 
possession of the fox.  Here, the passive enjoyment of the publicly 
coined designation is not enough, the referent-mark holder must seize 
the mark from its status as a designation in the public domain through 
bona fide use in commerce.  Until the mark is appropriated, 
interlopers like the second hunter in Post may be able to obtain a 
property interest in the mark, if they appropriate it first.  While the 
hunt without capture may be insufficient to convey trademark rights, 
it may be sufficient under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act’s broad 
prohibition on many types of unfair competition, to convey standing 
192. Id.
193. See Pierson v.  Post, 3 Cai.  175 (N.Y.  Sup.  Ct.  1805).
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to allege claims that protect the public’s interest.  In other words, the 
referent-mark holder may not own the designation, but it may have 
rights to prevent others from using the designation, if that use 
constitutes some form of unfair competition. 
IV. Trademark Prosecution
This section will explore how public designations have been used 
as part of the trademark prosecution process.  Applications may be 
filed under several different sections of the Lanham Act.194 Section 
1(a) of the Lanham Act allows a party actually using the mark to file 
an application for a trademark registration.  Section 1(a) is textually 
ambiguous because it uses the phrase “the owner of a mark used in 
commerce,” but it does not explicitly require the owner to have been 
the party actually using the mark.195  However, interpreting section 
1(a) in light of the case law and the language in section 1(b), the 
intent to use provision, it is clear that the section 1(a) applicant must 
be the party to actually use the mark in bona fide interstate 
commerce.196  However, merely because the public’s use is insufficient 
to create trademark registration rights under section 1(a), the public’s 
independent use of a designation may be an adequate basis on which 
to oppose the registration of the mark by a competitor, or to support 
cancellation of a registered mark under section 2(d) of the Lanham 
Act.197
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act permits the opposition to— or 
cancelation of— a mark that: 
 
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or
194. LARS S.  SMITH & LLEWELLYN JOSEPH GIBBONS, MASTERING TRADEMARK 
LAW, Carolina Academic Press (forthcoming 2012). 
195. See Brody, supra note 73 at 1142.  This is also reflected in the language of the
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP).  See TMEP § 901.05  (5th ed.  Sept.  
2007) (use by related company) and TMEP § 903.05 (5th ed.  Sept.  2007) (use by 
predecessor in title). 
196. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1142.  The problem with this argument is that section 
1(b) was added to the 1946 Lanham Act (Pub.  L.  79-489) in 1988.  So, it is not clear that  
section 1(b) is a clear statement of Congress’ intent in enacting 1(a) in 1946.  However, the 
canons of statutory interpretation require that the two be read in pari materia and 
construed harmoniously.  See SMITH AND GIBBONS, supra note 194.  Cf.  Dastar Corp.  v.  
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.  23, 34-5 (2003)(using the 1990 Visual Artists 
Rights Act to interpret the scope of the meaning of the term “origin” as used in the 1946 
Lanham Act). 
197. See MCCARTHY, supra note 97 at § 7:18.
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trade name previously used in the United States by another 
and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in 
connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.198
The plain language of section 2(d) requires that the basis of the 
opposition or cancellation be the use of the designation as a mark by 
the party opposing the registration or petitioning for the cancellation 
of the trademark registration.  The opposer or petitioner must 
support their claim to the mark based on their own use of the mark 
and may not rely on third-party uses to make their case.
  
199  If third-
party trademark use is insufficient to make a prima facie case under 
section 2(d), then the public’s non-commercial use of a designation 
should also be irrelevant to an opposition or petition under the 
Lanham Act.200
Despite the black letter law regarding standing and trademark 
registration requirements, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) and the Federal Circuit have considered publicly created 
designations and the public’s use of such designations in trademark 
registration cases.
 
201  The first decision involving public designations 
was Peiper v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., and involved the mark 
BUNNY CLUB. 202
In addition to the trademark infringement litigation cases 
discussed previously, Volkswagen also had a line of trademark 
prosecution cases involving the mark BUG.
  The TTAB found that although Playboy 
Enterprises itself had not used the mark BUNNY CLUB prior to the 
petitioner, it had used the bunny symbol on its products and the word 
“Bunnies” to describe the attractive, scantly-costumed female staff 
working in its Clubs.  Moreover, newspapers referred to the Playboy 
Clubs as “Bunny Clubs.”  The TTAB found that the goodwill in the 
BUNNY CLUB mark resided in Playboy Enterprises.  However, the 
TTAB actually rested its decision on the grounds that Playboy had 
used the bunny symbol on numerous products, albeit not in 
association with the services offered by Playboy Clubs. 
203
198. Lanham Act §2(d), 15 U.S.C.§1126(e) (2006); see Brody, supra note 80, at 1143.
 Volkswagen opposed 
the registration for BUG COOLER for an automobile engine cooling 
199. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1143.
200. Id.  See also Fossil Inc.  v.  Fossil Group, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451 (T.T.A.B.
1998)(opposer must be a prior user). 
201. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1143.
202. Peiper v.  Playboy Enter.  Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q.  318 (T.T.A.B.  1979).
203. See Part II.C.1
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system.204
 The record clearly shows that opposer has acquired a right in 
the term “BUG” with regard to the automotive field.  The 
word “BUG” having been used by the public to denominate 
opposer’s automobiles, opposer is protected therein even 
though it has never used the designation Bug as a mark on 
automobiles.
 The TTAB found that there was extensive use of the 
designation Bug by Volkswagen in advertisements, for a rental car 
service, and in motion pictures such as the “Love Bug.” The TTAB 
then concluded: 
205
Here, there was extensive use of the mark BUG by Volkswagen.  
Even if Volkswagen never literally placed the mark on its 
automobiles, the company and its dealers made extensive use of the 
mark in commerce. 
The second case involved the trademark registration for a 
WUNDERBUG, a kit to convert the appearance of the front part of 
a Volkswagen sedan that was sold by both independent distributors 
and some Volkswagen dealers.206  Once again, while mentioning the 
public use of the designation Bug, the TTAB relied on Volkswagen’s 
extensive commercial use of the term, that Volkswagen had 
registered the mark GLITTER BUG, and the media’s independent 
use of the designation.207
Finally, Volkswagen petitioned for the cancellation of the 
registration of the mark in TULE BUG for a four-wheel drive off 
road vehicle in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Lieffring 
Industries, Inc.
 
208  Since the registrant had not used the mark for over 
two years, the TTAB found that the mark had been abandoned.209
204. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.  Thermo-Chem Corporation, 185 U.S.P.Q.
561, 561 (T.T.A.B.  1975). 
 
The germane point for this article was the TTAB’s finding that 
Volkswagen had standing because it would be injured by the 
continued registration of TULE BUG. The TTAB stated: 
205. Id.  at 562.
206. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.  Lieffring Industries, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q.
650, 652-53  (T.T.A.B.  1975). 
207. Id.  at 653.
208. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.  Advance Welding and Mfg.  Corp., 193
U.S.P.Q.  673, 675 (T.T.A.B.  1976). 
209. Id.  at 676.
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We find on the basis of the record herein that, as a result of 
petitioner’s long and extensive use in its advertising and 
material and many years use in a similar manner in the trade 
and by the news media, petitioner has acquired a proprietary 
right and hence a protectible [sic] right in “BUG” as an 
associative term for its vehicles notwithstanding that 
petitioner, insofar as this record shows, has never used 
“BUG” alone in a trademark sense.210
I will defer to the TTAB on whether Volkswagen used the 
designation Bug in a trademark sense on automobiles, as the courts 
construed the Lanham Act in 1975.  But clearly Volkswagen, through 
its extensive use of the mark in advertising to refer to its products, 
had in some sense appropriated the mark.  The TTAB further noted 
that: 
 
[i]n addition to use of the marks “VW” and
“VOLKSWAGEN” and the like to identify its vehicles in its
advertising and promotional material, [Volkeswagen] has,
since the early 1960’s, consistently used the terms “BUG” and
“BEETLE” in this material as terms of reference for its
vehicles.  As a result of such use, the term “BUG” has also
been extensively used by the public and the trade to identify
petitioner’s vehicles.211
The value in the term Bug, at least in this decision, was through 
the efforts of Volkswagen to develop goodwill in the term. At a bare 
minimum Volkswagen accepted the public’s gift of a designation and 
then invested significantly in it in order to develop goodwill in the 
designation. 
In American Stock Exchange, Inc. v. American Express Co., two 
titans battled over the rights to the mark AMEX for a broad array of 
auxiliary financial services.212
210. Id.  at 675.
  American Express applied to register 
AMEX for hotel services and financial services, from banking to 
insurance to investments.  The American Stock Exchange filed an 
opposition.  American Express then filed a petition for cancellation of 
the American Stock Exchange’s AMEX mark for periodicals and 
securities exchange services on the grounds that American Express 
211. Id.
212. Am.  Stock Ex., Inc.  v.  Am.  Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q.  356 (T.T.A.B.  1980).
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was the senior user of the AMEX mark.213
The AMEX trademark case is another example of significant 
public use by consumers, the industry, and the media, and some 
internal use by the parties.  The TTAB stated that priority could be 
awarded based on analogous trademark uses.  Analogous trademark 
uses are uses in advertising, as a distinguishing feature of a trade 
name, or as an acronym of a corporate name by the party asserting 
rights in the mark.
  Although the American 
Stock Exchange can trace its lineage back to 1840, it did not begin to 
use the name American Stock Exchange until 1953.  Almost 
immediately after changing its name, newspapers and members of the 
industry started to refer to the American Stock Exchange as AMEX. 
The American Stock Exchange also sued other businesses infringing 
the AMEX trademark.  American Express Co. traces its lineage to 
1850 and has been providing various financial services since 1882.  
There are records as early as 1854 using the term “Am. Ex. Co.” to 
refer to American Express.  Over time, “Am. Ex. Co.” evolved into 
the term “Amexco.”  As early as 1898, stock brokers referred to 
American Express Co. as AM EX.  However, American Express 
Co.’s first use of the mark AMEX was as a service mark dated to 
1969.  American Express Co. also took steps to protect the mark 
AMEX against infringing junior users. 
214 The TTAB then stated that the use must be 
open, calculated to attract the attention of the viewer, and to create 
an association with the goods or services in the relevant segment of 
the public.215
The TTAB, in a clear statement that the public may bestow a 
protectable property right on a referent mark holder held that: 
 
Further, it has been held that where the public has come to 
associate a term with a particular company and/or its goods or 
services as a result, for example, of use of the term in the trade 
and by the news media, that company has a protectable 
property right in the term even if the company itself has made 
no use of the term.216
It may have been scrivener’s error of omission by the TTAB or 
merely inadvertent sloppy drafting, but it may also be significant that 
 
213. Id.  at 357-58.
214. Id.  at 363.
215. Id.
216. Id.  at 364 (emphasis added).
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the TTAB glaringly omitted of the word trademark as a qualifier for 
the phrase “property right.”  The TTAB could have clearly written “a 
protectable [trademark] right.” A textual reading suggests that the 
TTAB recognized some form of a property right but not necessarily a 
trademark right.  However, a subsequent TTAB case distinguished 
this statement as mere dicta, so it may not be entitled to much weight 
in future cases.217  Further, this statement relied on cases that have 
been critically analyzed earlier in this article and shown to be not 
clearly supporting this proposition.218  There was also substantial use 
by both parties of the AMEX mark over a long period of time. 
Furthermore, AMEX is phonetically similar to American Express for 
trademark purposes, and may arguably just be the tacking on of 
trademark rights based on the long use of the AMERICAN 
EXPRESS mark.219
In Big Blue Products Inc. v. International Business Machines 
Corp., the TTAB qualified the position it had taken earlier in 
American Express.
 
220  IBM filed a trademark registration for the mark 
BIG BLUE for typewriter ribbons.221  IBM rested its claim on the 
extensive use by the public, the news media, and of course by IBM, 
which predated the opposer’s first use in commerce.222
217. Big Blue Products Inc.  v.  Int’l Bus.  Machines Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072, 1074
n.2 (T.T.A.B.  1991).
  While in this 
case, the court was prepared to accept that the public associated BIG 
BLUE with IBM, there was a dispute of material fact regarding 
whether the public understood the designation Big Blue as merely 
another trade name for IBM, or whether it was associated with a 
specific IBM product—a trademark for typewriter ribbon produced 
by IBM.  The TTAB then considered whether IBM’s other uses of 
the mark BIG BLUE could be tacked on to its use of the mark with 
typewriter ribbons.  The end result of this case was that IBM might 
not have had sufficient rights to register the mark, but it did have 
218. See generally Part II.
219. The phonetics or sound of a mark is one of a mark’s most salient characteristics,
and is a significant element in whether the current use of a junior mark may have the same 
priority date of a senior mark.  See Int’l Bus.  Machines Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.  2d at 1074. 
220. Id.  At least one article opined, “the TTAB may have had some reservations
about the [p]ublic use rule and was not prepared to give it an unqualified endorsement.” 
Brody, supra note 80, at 1149. 
221. Id.  at 1073.
222. Id.  There is some suggestion in the record that IBM found the Big Blue reference
to be objectionable—at least at some point in the Company’s history.  
   
78 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 35:1 
sufficient property rights under the natural expansion of business 
doctrine to prevent the opposer from registering the mark.223
These TTAB cases may best be characterized as analogous use 
cases.  An analogous use is an insufficient commercial use to 
constitute a use in commerce for obtaining trademark owner rights, 
where there could still be sufficient other uses to obtain limited rights, 
such as the earlier priority date or the right to file an opposition to 
another’s trademark registration.
 
224  Under the doctrine of analogous 
use, “[a]dvertising and promotion is sufficient to obtain rights in a 
mark as long as they occur within a commercially reasonable time 
prior to the actual rendition of service.”225
These TTAB cases and several other TTAB cases that were not 
discussed in this article
  They are also readily 
distinguishable from the future crowd sourcing cases that this article 
anticipates, where the mark is rapidly created and permeates the 
market place without the referent-mark holder adopting the mark or 
being able to demonstrate any internal or external use, and must rely 
solely on some existing trademark doctrine, like the public use 
doctrine, that would attribute actual non-commercial use by the 
public as constructive trademark use by the referent-mark holder. 
226 set the stage for National Cable Television 
Ass’n, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., in which the Federal 
Circuit considered the trademark rights in the trade name ACE.227  In 
1951, the American Cinema Editors, Inc. (“Editors”) was formed to 
promote the art and science of film editing.  It is an exclusive 
invitation-only membership organization.  Members are entitled to 
use the acronym ACE after their names in television and motion 
picture credits.  Members of the media and motion picture industry 
often shorten “American Cinema Editors” to ACE.   Each year ACE 
honors achievement by awarding the “A.C.E. Quarterly Awards” 
which was shortened to “EDDIE” in 1962, and is also called the 
“ACE EDDIE” or the “ACE AWARDS.”228
In 1979, the National Cable Television Association, Inc. 
(“Cable”), representing the cable television industry, created the 
“ACE” award, an acronym for “Award for Cablecasting Excellence.” 
 
223. Id.  at 1075.
224. See MCCARTHY, supra note 85 at § 20:17.
225. Maryland Stadium Authority v.  Becker, 806 F.  Supp.  1236, 1239 (D.  Md.   1992)
(internal citations and quotation omitted). 
226. See generally Brody, supra note 80, at 1146-51.
227. See Am.  Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d at 1574.
228. Id.  at 1577.
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The Editors immediately objected.  Cable denied that its concurrent 
use would create a likelihood of consumer confusion, but offered to 
use the full name in addition to the ACE mark and to use its NCTA 
logo in addition to ACE mark.  Over time, Cable started to use ACE 
mark alone, and did not comply with the offer it made in its letter, 
leading to instances of actual confusion.  In response, Cable 
registered the ACE as its service mark.   Apparently, unaware that 
Cable had registered ACE as a service mark, Editors wrote and asked 
Cable to change the name of its award.  Upon discovering Cable’s 
registration of the ACE mark, the Editors filed a timely petition to 
cancel Cable’s registration of the ACE mark.  The TTAB cancelled 
Cable’s trademark registration, and Cable then appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.229
The dispute before the Federal Circuit focused on whether the 
Editors had produced sufficient evidence to establish rights in ACE 
as a trade name.  The Editors had substantial evidence of third parties 
using the term ACE as a trade name for the Editors award.
  
230  Cable 
focused the court’s attention on whether the Editors actually used 
ACE as a trade name, as required under the plain language of 
Lanham Act § 2(d).231  Although Editors had not adopted ACE as a 
trade name in its by-laws or used it on its letterhead, Editors did use it 
within the text of articles in its publications and correspondence, and 
even published a commemorative book with ACE in the title.232
Cable then questioned whether this use was sufficiently open and 
notorious to establish trademark rights.  The Federal Circuit rejected 
Cable’s argument because the use was sufficiently public so that the 
relevant public clearly identified ACE with the Editors.
 
233
In dicta, the court continued: 
 
Moreover, even without use directly by the claimant of the 
rights, the courts and the Board generally have recognized 
that abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or names 
used only by the public give rise to protectable rights in the 
owners of the trade name or mark which the public modified.  
Such public use by others inures to the claimant’s benefit and, 
229. Id.  at 1574.
230. Id.  at 1577.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.  at 1580.
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where this occurs, public use can reasonably be deemed use 
“by” that party in the sense of a use on its behalf.234
The Federal Circuit continued that the Editors are not required to 
meet the technical statutory requirements to obtain a trademark 
registration in order to have a basis to oppose a trademark 
registration, and found that Editors had sufficient use of the ACE 
designation (trade name) to petition for the mark’s cancellation.
 
235
The TTAB cases following American Cinema Editors seemed to 
be slowly working the public use doctrine into the case law—at least 
as dicta in support of other independent grounds for the TTAB’s 
ultimate holding.   For example, in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. 
Quest Associates, LTD, the applicant filed a registration for 
COLAJACK for alcoholic beverages.
  
236  Jack Daniel’s, a leading 
producer of Tennessee whiskey since 1866, filed an opposition.  The 
TTAB found that Jack Daniel’s clearly promoted itself as JACK and 
produced numerous products where JACK, the disputed element of 
the mark, was a significant element of the mark.  However, the TTAB 
did cite to American Cinema Editors and IBM in a footnote. 237
V. Trademark Dilution
 
However, even with dicta in precedential TTAB decisions and 
positive language in a Federal Circuit opinion, the public use doctrine 
does not appear to be gaining acceptance as an independent basis on 
which to award trademark rights.  Rather, it is well grounded in the 
doctrine of analogous trademark use and provides a ground on which 
to oppose the registration of—or to petition for the cancellation of 
the registration of — the mark. 
Even absent a likelihood of consumer confusion, famous marks 
are protected against trademark dilution.238
234. Id.  at 1577-78 (footnote citing cases omitted).
  This section will analyze 
whether trademark dilution is sufficiently robust to protect the 
owners of famous marks who do not appropriate public designations 
or who may have abandoned them.  Remember that all of the marks 
where the court found that the public use doctrine applied involved 
marks that would arguably be famous marks under the Lanham Act.  
235. Id.
236. Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc.  v.  Quest Assocs., LTD, 2000 WL 992415 (T.T.A.B.
2000) 
237. Id.  at *6 n.12.
238. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
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Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 (TDRA), the 
section 43(c) of the Lanham Act recognizes two types of trademark 
dilution: dilution-by-blurring and dilution-by-tarnishment. 239   In 
addition, some states have state trademark laws that protects 
distinctive as well as famous marks.240  This section will focus on 
federal trademark dilution law.  The elements for infringement of a 
famous mark by trademark dilution under the TDRA are: first, the 
mark must be famous;241 second, the defendant must be using a mark 
in commerce in a manner that is blurring or tarnishing the famous 
mark; third, the similarity between the defendant’s mark and the 
famous mark must create an association between the two marks; and 
finally, the association is likely to either blur the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark or to tarnish the reputation of the famous mark.242
A. Famous Mark
 
“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of 
the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”243  In determining whether 
a mark is famous, Congress provided an illustrative set of relevant 
factors that a court may consider: duration, extent, and geographic 
extent of advertising or other publicity; amount, volume, and 
geographic extent of the commercial use of the mark; extent of the 
actual recognition of the mark; and whether the mark was ever 
registered.244
239. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B) & § 43(c)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
  The TDRA standard for a mark to be legally famous is 
extremely high and should not be equated with “fame” for the 
purposes of the likelihood of consumer confusion factors test.  
Professor McCarthy observed that “[t]he standard for the kind of 
‘fame’ needed to trigger anti-dilution protection is more rigorous and 
240. SIEGRUN D.  KANE, KANE ON TRADEMARK LAW § 9:2.1; § 9:6.4; MARK S.  LEE, 
ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2:91. 
241. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.  v.  Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264-65
(4th Cir.   2007). 
242. Id.  at 265.
243. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).  .  The TDRA legislatively
overruled earlier circuit case law under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) that 
recognized something called “niche fame.” See Coach Serv., Inc.  v.  Triumph Learning 
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372  (Fed.  Cir.  2012).  (Even niche fame was a high hurdle to 
prove.) See Grupo Gigante SA De Cv v.  Dalos & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1108 (9th Cir.  
2004) ( “a mark should not be categorized as ‘famous’ unless it is known to more than 50 
percent of the defendant’s potential customersquoting MCCARTHY, supra note 85 at § 
24:1112) 
244. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
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demanding than the ‘fame’ which is sufficient for the classic 
likelihood of confusion test.” 245  “While fame for dilution “is an 
either/or proposition”—it either exists or does not—fame for 
likelihood of confusion is a matter of degree along a continuum.  
Accordingly, a mark can acquire “sufficient public recognition and 
renown to be famous for purposes of likelihood of confusion without 
meeting the more stringent requirement for dilution fame.”246  Courts 
have observed that it is “well-established that dilution fame is difficult 
to prove,” placing a rigorous burden on the plaintiff.247
In the introduction to this article, there was a brief discussion of 
the mark APP STORE as an example of the brevity from first use in 
commerce to a credible claim to achieving famous mark status in both 
the Web 2.0 and social media context.  The APP STORE mark case 
also shows the difficulty of achieving the level of consumer awareness 
necessary to establish that a mark is truly a famous mark. 
 
Apple asserts that it has used the “App Store” mark for over 
three years; the mark has been exposed to the owners of more than 
160 million Apple mobile devices worldwide; consumers have 
downloaded software applications more than 10 billion times; the 
mark has been the subject of extensive advertising across the United 
States with hundreds of millions of dollars spent on advertising; the 
mark has garnered significant Web presence and unsolicited third-
party publications discussing the brand; the mark has a robust 
presence throughout the United States and abroad; and that the mark 
has been registered by Apple in more than fifty countries.248
Considering the section 43(c)(2)(a) statutory factors such as “(1) 
the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and 
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner 
or third parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of 
sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (3) the extent of 
actual recognition of the mark,”
 
249
245. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at § 24:104 (internal citations omitted) (quoted in
Coach Serv., Inc., 668 F.3d at 1372). 
  the APP STORE mark should be 
an easy case for a court to find that the mark qualified as a famous 
mark.  However, the court rejected Apple’s claim that APP STORE 
was a famous mark, and concluded that: 
246. Coach Serv., Inc., 668 F.3d at 1372.
247. Id.  at 1373.
248. Apple, Inc.  v.  Amazon.com Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.  2d 1835, 1842 (N.D.  Cal.   2011).
249. See Lanham Act 43(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
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First, Apple has not established that its “App Store” mark is 
famous, in the sense of being “prominent” and “renowned.” 
The evidence does show that Apple has spent a great deal of 
money on advertising and publicity, and has 
sold/provided/furnished a large number of apps from its 
AppStore, and the evidence also reflects actual recognition of 
the “App Store” mark.  However, there is also evidence that 
the term “App store” is used by other companies as a 
descriptive term for a place to obtain software applications for 
mobile devices.250
Consequently, trademark dilution may prove to be an illusory 
remedy to the vast majority of referent-mark holders, except for those 
who own the most valuable and well-established trademarks. 
 
B. Use of Mark in Commerce
If the owner of the mark surmounts the difficult obstacle of
proving that the mark is truly famous and not a merely generally well-
known mark or a mark having renown in a niche market, the mark 
owner under the facts of the types of cases analyzed in this article will 
have the relatively easy burden of showing commercial use.251  This 
article focuses on the public designations which were either 
unclaimed or affirmatively rejected by the holder of the famous mark, 
which have now been appropriated by a competitor or other 
commercial entity.  However, the appropriation of the public 
designation by a competitor, even if it is solely to prevent the 
referent-mark owner from using or adopting the public designation, 
should be a sufficiently  commercial use to justify a finding of 
trademark commercial use.  Accordingly, because use of the mark in 
commerce is a relatively low barrier, it should be easy to demonstrate 
at trial.252
250. Apple, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.  2d at 1844.
 
251. The issues raised in Part II.B of this article regarding what constitutes “use in
commerce” also applies with equal force to actions brought under section 43(c)(1) for 
infringement by dilution.  Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006) (“The owner of 
a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as 
the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person’s commercial use in 
commerce of a mark or trade name,”).  However, use by a competitor is more likely to be 
in the ordinary course of trade than use by the public. 
 252. Cf.  Gideons Intern., Inc.  v.  Gideon 300 Ministries, Inc. 
94 F.  Supp.  2d 566, 577 (E.D.  Pa.  1999)(commercial use by non-profit competitors). 
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C. Similarity of The Marks
In determining whether a junior user’s use of a designation dilutes
the distinctiveness of the famous mark the court must consider the 
degree of similarity between the two.  Section 43(c) “does not require 
that a plaintiff establish that the junior mark is identical, nearly 
identical or substantially similar to the senior mark in order to obtain 
injunctive relief.”253  Similarity of the mark and the designation is 
merely one of the six factors that a court must consider in 
determining whether the junior user’s use of the mark is likely to 
impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.254  In Starbucks Corp. 
v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., Starbucks alleged that the
defendant’s mark for coffee CHARBUCKS diluted its famous
STARBUCKS mark.  The Second Circuit rejected the proposition
that “dissimilarity alone is sufficient to defeat” a trademark dilution
claim.255
D. Blurring or Tarnishment of the Famous Mark
  Therefore, a competitor’s use of a public designation, even if
the designation in terms of sight, sound, or meaning is far from that of
the famous mark, may still dilute the distinctiveness of the famous
mark by blurring.
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act prohibits uses of a designation
that may lessen the distinctiveness of a famous trademark.  The 
FTDA recognizes dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment as 
two forms of trademark dilution.  This section will discuss both forms 
of trademark dilution and conclude that dilution by blurring is likely 
to occur in the context of a competitor using a public designation that 
is associated by the public with the famous mark even absent 
appropriation of the designation by the referent famous mark 
holder.256
1. Dilution by Blurring
 
Dilution by blurring is an “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
253. Levi Strauss & Co.  v.  Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158,
1172 (9th Cir.  2011). 
254. Id.
255. Starbucks Corp.  v.  Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 107-08 (2d Cir.
2009). 
256. Noncommercial use is a defense under setion 43(c), so the owner of the famous
mark is unlikely to have a claim against the public or the media.  See 15 U.S.C.  § 
1125(c)(3).  Cf.  Lucasfilm Ltd.  v.  High Frontier, 622 F.  Supp.  931, 934 n.2 (D.D.C.  
1985). 
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distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 257  Secondary meaning may 
create such an association.  The mere use of a similar mark that calls 
to mind the famous mark is insufficient to find the required 
association.258  The owner of the famous mark is always required to 
show that the association likely impairs the distinctiveness of the 
mark.  Clearly, if the use of the public designation is confusingly 
similar to the famous mark, then the famous mark is likely to be 
diluted.  However, if the designation and its commercial use by a 
competitor are able to send two simultaneous and contradictory 
messages—a message that calls to mind the famous mark while 
simultaneously conveying that it is not the source of the famous 
mark—then there is no association that impairs the distinctiveness of 
the mark (blurring) for trademark dilution.259
2. Dilution by Tarnishment
  Outside the trademark 
parody context, it is unlikely that a public designation that is being 
used by a competitor will able to call to mind the famous mark for the 
product associated while being able to simultaneously distinguish 
itself from the famous mark. 
Dilution by tarnishment is an “association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”260  Tarnishment has not 
been illustratively defined, except as a semantic association with 
bawdy or lewd sex (or products associated with sex).261
257. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
  Not all public 
designations are positive or convey in the opinion of the mark holder 
the appropriate consistent brand image.  In determining which 
associations are tarnishing to a brand, courts engage in “an economic 
prediction about consumer taste and how the prediction reaction of 
258. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d at 267.
259. Id.  at 268.
260. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
261. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc.  v.  Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387-88 (6th Cir.  2010),
cert.  denied, 131 S.  Ct.  1003 (2011).  The author assumes that the court’s limitation on sex 
so that it encompassed only bawdy or lewd sex (as opposed to tasteful sex) was a 
requirement in light of Victoria Secret’s preeminent reputation for offering fashionable 
and sexually suggestive undergarments for women.  See KIT YARROW AND JAYNE 
O’DONNELL, GEN BUY: HOW TWEENS, TEENS AND TWENTY-SOMETHINGS ARE 
REVOLUTIONIZING RETAIL.  31 (Jossey-Bass 2009).  See also Moseley v.  V.  Secret 
Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S.  418, 425 n.  3 (2002) (“Victoria’s Secret stores sell a complete line 
of lingerie, women’s undergarments and nightwear, robes, caftans and kimonos, slippers, 
sachets, lingerie bags, hanging bags, candles, soaps, cosmetic brushes, atomizers, bath 
products and fragrances.”). 
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conventional consumers in our culture will affect the economic value 
of the famous mark.”262
As discussed earlier, Coca-Cola discouraged consumers from 
asking for “Coke” when they wanted a Coca-Cola brand beverage, 
and Harley-Davidson discouraged consumer and media use of the 
designation Hog to refer to its brand of motorcycles.
 
263  This trend 
continues.  Tasteful modern examples of arguably unflattering 
designations are “whole paycheck,” for the food retailer Whole 
Foods, or “needless mark-up” for the Neiman Marcus department 
store chain, or other designations that may be neutral, inconsistent, 
consistent, or even flattering with the brand’s image such as Tarjay or 
Tarzhay for Target Stores.264  Many of the public’s designations may 
be scurrilous, vulgar, pornographic, or even border on the obscene.  
However, these terms are unlikely to be appropriated by a 
competitor, and if they are appropriated, they are likely candidates 




Unlike traditional trademark infringement based on the
likelihood of consumer confusion caused by the junior user’s use of 
the mark in commerce, the Lanham Act does not require that the 
holder of the famous mark also own the junior mark that allegedly 
dilutes the senior famous mark.266
262. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388.
  The use or threatened use of a 
public designation that dilutes a famous mark is sufficient to state a 
claim even if the holder of the famous mark has no legal interest in 
263. See Part III.C.
264. See John Letzing, CEO bemoans ‘Whole Paycheck’ nickname.,WALL ST.  J., Mar.
3, 2011, available at http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-03-
03/industries/30736343_1_foods-market-executive-john-mackey-unhealthy-items. 
265. The designation may not be eligible for registration under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act as immoral, scandalous, or disparaging.  See In Re McGinley, 600 F.2d 481, 
485 (C.C.P.A.  1981)(refusal to register immoral, scandalous, or disparaging marks under 
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act not a First Amendment violation).  Also, such a mark may 
not be protected under common law.  See Stephen R.  Baird, Moral Intervention in the 
Trademark Arena; Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 
TRADEMARK REP.  661, 793-94 (1993); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics Of The 
Scandalous and The Immoral and The Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After 
Lawrence v.  Texas, 9 MARQ.  INTELL.  PROP.  L.  REV.  187, 232 (1995). 
266. See Visa Intern.  Service Ass’n v.  JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1089-90 (9th Cir.
2010).  By definition of trademark dilution, there are two marks a senior famous mark, 
and a junior mark that is owned by another which is allegedly diluting the distinctiveness 
of the senior mark.  See id. 
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the junior mark.  At least one article contends that even an 
abandoned mark by a famous mark holder may serve as a basis for a 
claim for dilution of a currently famous mark.267
VI. Unfair Competition, False Advertising, and Other Claims
 
Although trademark infringement may not provide a remedy to
the referent-mark holder against a competitor adopting or using a 
confusingly similar public designation, the mark holder is not without 
remedies.   Unfair competition law is one available remedy.  There 
are also potential remedies under section 43(a)(2) of the Lanham Act 
for false advertising, section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, which prohibits “deceptive acts or practices,” or its state mini-
FTC Act analogs.268
A. Unfair Competition
  A creative attorney is sure to find other possible 
claims, especially under state law, to protect the holder of the 
referent-mark against use of a publically coined designation by other 
commercial entities. 
The law of unfair competition is robust and prohibits many forms
of unfair competition, 269  and ownership of the publicly coined 
designation by the plaintiff is not necessarily an element of an unfair 
competition.270  “Some courts have even said that unfair competition 
is ‘the umbrella for all statutory and non-statutory causes of action 
arising out of business conduct that is contrary to honest practice in 
industrial and commercial matters.’”271  The early cases involving 
confusing public designations were readily resolved on principles of 
unfair competition law.272
267. See Don Nottingham, Comment: Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and
Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relation, 
75 U.  COLO.  L.  REV.  1065, 1094-95 (2004). 
  So, whether unfair competition provides 
judicial remedy will not be developed further in this section.  Unfair 
competition still remains a ready remedy in many of the situations 
discussed in this article and for the future protection of crowd sourced 
publicly coined designations that this article analyzes.   
268. See, e.g., Vermont v.  Int’l Collection Serv., Inc.  594 A.2d 426, 430-31 (Vt.
1991)(describing state mini-FTC Acts). 
269. MCCARTHY, supra note 97 at  § 1:8 & 1:9.
270. See Exxon Corp.  v.  Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir.
19982). 
271. LOUIS ALTMAN AND MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR.
& MONO.  § 2:2 (4th ed.)(footnote omitted). 
272. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1126-31; Section II.C.1.
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The only underlying principle which has been developed in 
the field of unfair trade practices is the principle of passing 
off, which ‘affords relief wherever, by reason of an 
unjustifiable act, the goods of one party to the suit will 
probably be accepted by the purchasing public as the goods of 
another.273
So, the law not only prohibits harm to a company’s good will that 
is a result of deceptive marking, trademark infringement, and the 
misappropriation of intangible trade values, such as trade secrets,
   
274 
but also dilution of trade symbols, the misappropriation of business 
values, and even causes of action relating to broader competition 
law.275  Using a public designation to pass off the goods or services of 
a competitor as those of the referent mark holder would surely fall 
under the rubric of unfair competition even absent any trademark use 
of the public designation by the referent-mark holder.276  Although 
state unfair competition laws may prohibit other acts in addition to 
passing off, state common law or statutory remedies for unfair 
competition are usually at least as extensive as section 43(a)’s 
prohibition on “false designations of origin” or passing off and often 
provide additional causes of action.277
B. False Advertising
 
Crowd sourced marks raise novel issues of trademark law.  So far
courts have not applied section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act’s 
prohibition on false statements of fact in commercial advertising to 
disputes regarding confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship.278 
Confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship claims are usually 
brought under section 43(a)(1)(A).  However, courts over the past 
fifty years have continually expanded the reach of section 
43(a)(1)(B).279
273. Altman and Pollack, supra note 236.
  There is a possibility that new forms of advertising and 
uses of marks may result in the designation being used in a manner 
274. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995)
275. Altman and Pollack, supra note 271.
276. See Dastar Corp.  v.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.  23, 29 (2003).
277. See Buying For The Home, LLC v.  Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F.Supp.2d 310,
317 (D.  N.J.   2006). 
278. See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).  .
279. See generally Bruce P Keller, “It Keeps Going and Going and Going”: The
Expansion of False Advertising Litigation under the Lanham Act, 59 SPG LAW & 
CONTEMP.  PROBS.  131, 132-33 (1996). 
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that is understood by the public as a statement of fact and therefore 
actionable under section 43(a)(1)(B).280
[a]ny person . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, that
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely
to be damaged by such act.
 Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the 
Lanham Act provides that  
281
This section confers standing on competitors or other commercial 
entities that are not necessarily claiming trademark rights in the 
public designation.282  The elements of a section 43(a)(1)(B) claim are 
that the defendant made false or misleading factual representations; 
that the defendant used the false or misleading representations in 
commerce; that the deceptions are material and likely to influence 
consumer decisions; and that the defendant’s actions made the 
plaintiff believe that it is likely to be damaged by such false or 
misleading factual representations.283
The courts analyze the advertisement from the perspective of a 
reasonable person.
  So, ownership of the mark is 
not an element of false advertising. 
284  Courts have categorized false or deceptive 
commercial speech as either explicitly or implicitly false.285  Explicitly 
and implicitly false statements are analyzed differently.286  An explicit 
or literally false statement is a statement that is false on its face.  
Implicitly false statements are more problematic.287  An implicitly 
false statement is a statement that is literally true but likely to mislead 
a significant portion of consumers. 288
280. I will leave flushing out this hypothetical to another article, commentator to
another day, or await the inevitable complaint raising this issue. 
  With an implicitly false 
statement, before enjoining the advertisement, the court will require 
evidence of how the message conveyed by the statement is 
281. Lanham Act §43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.  § 1126 (2006).
282. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 183 at § 27:32 (discussing standing under Lanham
Act §43(a)(1)(B)). 
283. See American Italian Pasta Co.  v.  New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390 (8th
Cir.  2004).  See also MCCARTHY, supra note 245 at § 27:55. 
284. See Freeman v.  Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir.  1995).
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understood by reasonable consumers.289  The plaintiff has to produce 
evidence that consumers were actually deceived, not that they may 
have been deceived.290  This evidentiary burden requires that the 
plaintiff produce consumer surveys or other evidence of consumer 
perceptions of the advertisement.291  There is no bright line rule as to 
how many consumers must be deceived.292
However, the plaintiff may avoid the need for consumer surveys if 
the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the defendant egregiously and 
intentionally set out to deceive the public.
 
293  If so, then the court may 
presume that the public was in fact deceived.  Once the court finds 
deceptive intent, the burden will then shift to the defendant to show 
that consumers were not deceived.294  In the prototypical case that this 
article posits, it is clearly the competitor that will adopt the 
designation with knowledge that it refers to the referent-mark holder.  
Whether this fact standing alone will demonstrate or create a 
presumption of bad faith is questionable.295  The seminal article on the 
public use doctrine recommends that courts focus on the meaning of 
the public designation rather than its appearance. 296   Semiotic 
meaning of the publicly coined designation both refers back to the 
referent-mark, and potentially carries additional socially laden 
meaning to the consumer and the public.297
C. The Federal Trade Commission Act and State Mini-FTC Acts
  Under principles of false 
advertising, if the court must consider how the consumer understood 
the message in the context of the marketplace, and if the public 
designation, no matter how different from the referent-mark, is 
merely another name for the referent-mark, then the use of the public 
designation by a competitor in advertising to refer to someone other 
than the referent-mark holder is impermissible. 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and its state




292. MCCARTHY, supra note 183 at § 27:57
293. See GAC Intern., Inc., 862 F.2d at 977.
294. See id.
295. But see Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354 (knowing adoption of a trademark of another
creates a presumption of bad faith). 
296. See Brody, supra 73, at 1164.
297. See generally Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH.  U.  L.  REV.  489
(2006). 
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practices.298  Unfortunately, there is only an extremely weak case to 
be made for a plaintiff to assert that section 5 provides a private cause 
of action.299 However, private parties have standing under many state 
Little FTC Acts. 300  Courts have found that an act is unfair or 
deceptive under section 5, if it has as tendency to deceive the public.301 
Unlike the Lanham Act, which protects only reasonable and prudent 
consumers in the context of the marketplace, the section 5 protects: 
“the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the 
unthinking, and the credulous,” 302  as long as they are acting 
reasonably under the circumstances. 303
Section 52 of the FTC Act specifically provides that the 
dissemination of a false advertisement is an unfair and deceptive 
trade practice if the advertised product consists of food, drugs, or 
cosmetics.
  Arguably, if the public 
designates Peanuts for a chain of restaurants with the trademark 
PEEBODY, then members of the public, even those more 
sophisticated than the ignorant and the credulous, would be deceived 
if a competitor started to use the public designation Peanuts to 
describe its goods or services. 
304   An advertisement is false if it contains materially 
misleading content.305
While the FTC Act does not provide an adequate remedy to 
private parties, it does admit the potential of a regulatory remedy for 
the misappropriation of a crowd sourced publically coined 
 Content is material if it is of the type that a 
consumer would rely in making a purchasing decision.  Identification 
or association with well-known products is the bedrock of trademark 
goodwill and the type of information that consumers are likely to rely 
on. 
298. See 15 U.S.C.  §45(a)(1); Jeter v.  Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1172 (11th 
Cir.  1985); Int’l Collection Serv., Inc., 594 A.2d at 430-31. 
299. See Guernsey v.  Rich Plan of the Midwest, 406 F.  Supp.  582, 586-87 (N.D.  Ind.
1976) (applying the “doctrine of implication” to find federal jurisdiction under §5 of the 
FTC Act), but see ABA Distributors, Inc.  v.  Adolph Coors Co., 496 F.  Supp.  1194, 1199 
(D.  Mo.  1980).  See also STEPHANIE W.  KANWIT, 1 FED.  TRADE COMM’N § 6:8 (2012); 
Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under The Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering The 
FTC Act As Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST.  L.J.  437, 440 n.21 (1991)(citing extensive 
authorities for the proposition that there is no private right of action under §5 of the FTC 
Act.). 
300. See Brian D.  Wright, Social Media and Marketing: Exploring the Legal Pitfalls of
User-Generated Content, 36 U.  DAYTON L.  REV.  67, 71  (2010). 
301. Jeter v.  Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir.  1985).
302. Id.  at 1172-73.
303. See F.T.C.  v.  Cantkier, 767 F.  Supp.  2d 147, 151-52 (D.D.C.  2011).
304. 15 U.S.C.  §52 (2006).
305. 15 U.S.C. §55 (2006).
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designation.   However, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act’s unfair 
competition provisions, coupled with state unfair competition law and 
the possibility of false advertising claims taken together, provide a 
robust remedy for the appropriation of a publicly coined designation 
that is used in a manner that deceives the public. 
VII.Conclusion
Unlike love, which it is said “changes everything,”306
One court has said that it is “doubtful” whether a 
manufacturer can claim protection for an abbreviation that 
only the public and not the manufacturer has used.  Other 
decisions indicate that where, as a result of use by customers, 
the trade or by the news media, an abbreviation has become 
identified in the public mind with a particular company, then 
that abbreviation is a protectable trademark, even if the 
company itself has not formally used the abbreviation as a 
trademark mark.
  Web 2.0 and 
the new forms of social media, merely rearrange, reprioritize, and 
reallocate power-relations; and therefore, may require the re-thinking 
of existing trademark law.  The trademark law regarding ownership 
or rights in the crowd-sourced mark is unclear.  A leading trademark 
commentator and trademark treatise author, Professor McCarthy 
stated that: 
307
The author of the leading law review article on the publicly 
coined trademarks observed that courts are “hesitant to recognize 
valuable property rights in a name that has not been used by the party 
claiming those rights.”308
 306.  Sarah Brightman, Love Changes Everything, 
http://josvg.home.xs4all.nl/cits/sb/sb507.html. 
  Yet, these publicly coined designations are 
becoming increasingly commercially significant as Web 2.0 and social 
media technologies amplify the ability of consumers to affect brand 
image and nomenclature.  Therefore, a prudent attorney would not 
rely on a court electing to give his client trademark rights that the 
client has not yet appropriated through its own use by imputing the 
public’s use of the designation as a constructive use by the client.  The 
prudent approach is to monitor terms used by the public to designate 
a client’s products or services then appropriate the trademark rights 
307. MCCARTHY, supra note 97, at § 7:18.
308. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1159.
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in the term as the earliest possible date.  One should rely, only if 
necessary, on the public’s use of the designation as either evidence of 
secondary meaning to establish an early priority date, or as a ground 
for opposition to a trademark registration or as a ground supporting a 
petition to cancel a trademark registration. 
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* * *
